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ABSTRACT
It can be profitable for vehicle service providers to set service prices
based on users’ travel demand on different origin-destination pairs.
The prior studies on the spatial pricing of vehicle service rely on the
assumption that providers know users’ demand. In this paper, we
study a monopolistic provider who initially does not know users’
demand and needs to learn it over time by observing the users’ re-
sponses to the service prices. We design a pricing and vehicle supply
policy, considering the tradeoff between exploration (i.e., learning
the demand) and exploitation (i.e., maximizing the provider’s short-
term payoff). Considering that the provider needs to ensure the
vehicle flow balance at each location, its pricing and supply deci-
sions for different origin-destination pairs are tightly coupled. This
makes it challenging to theoretically analyze the performance of
our policy. We analyze the gap between the provider’s expected
time-average payoffs under our policy and a clairvoyant policy,
which makes decisions based on complete information of the de-
mand. We prove that after running our policy for D days, the loss in
the expected time-average payoff can be at most O
(
(lnD) 12 D− 14
)
,
which decays to zero as D approaches infinity.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Networks→Network economics; • Theory of computation
→ Online learning algorithms; • Applied computing → Trans-
portation; • Social and professional topics→ Pricing and resource
allocation.
KEYWORDS
Pricing with unknown demand, exploration and exploitation, vehi-
cle service, flow balance, spatial pricing
1 INTRODUCTION
Many vehicle service providers (e.g., taxi companies and ride-sharing
platforms) charge users based on the users’ origins and destinations
as well as the travel distances [20]. This is because users’ travel de-
mand varies significantly across origin-destination pairs (hereafter
referred to as links). A vehicle service provider needs to jointly
optimize its service prices for different links. The reason is that a
user takes the vehicle service if and only if it accepts the price and
there is enough vehicle supply on the corresponding link. Since the
provider should route vehicles across links, its vehicle supply and
pricing decisions for different links are tightly coupled. This makes
the pricing of vehicle service different from those of many other
services (e.g., electric power service [15] and mobile data service
[13]).
There have been some studies investigating providers’ pricing
and vehicle supply decisions [2, 5, 19]. A common assumption made
in these studies is that for each link, the providers have complete
information of users’ aggregate demand as a function of the service
price. In practice, the providers initially may not know the users’
aggregate demand. Instead, since the users have similar demand
patterns during the same time period of different days, the providers
can learn the users’ demand over days by testing different prices
and observing the users’ responses. Intuitively, the providers can
test prices with a large variance to expedite the learning process.
However, this may yield low payoffs to the providers in the short
run. Therefore, the providers should carefully make their decisions
to trade off the exploration (i.e., learning the demand to improve
the long-term decision making) and exploitation (i.e., maximizing
their short-term payoffs). As far as we know, none of the prior
studies investigated this tradeoff in the pricing of vehicle service
with unknown demand. This motivates our study in this work.
1.1 Our Work
We study a vehicle service provider’s pricing and supply policy. On
each day, the provider decides its service prices for all links, where
the prices are measured in dollars per time slot.1 Moreover, for
each link, the provider decides the rate at which its vehicles depart
from the origin to the destination.2 The provider’s vehicle supply
decisions should ensure the vehicle flow balance. In the system’s
steady state, the rate that the vehicles depart from a location (to
other locations) should equal the rate that the vehicles arrive at this
location. The vehicle flow balance constraint couples the provider’s
decisions for different links, and makes it challenging to design the
pricing and supply policy.
At the beginning of each day, the provider announces its prices.
During the day, the aggregate demand on each link is realized
and observed by the provider. The realized aggregate demand is
a function of the price and a random demand shock. The demand
shocks are different across links and days, and their values are not
known by the provider. Our purpose is to design a policy that helps
the provider estimate the parameters associated with the demand
functions and achieve a high time-average payoff.
To focus on the policy design with the unknown demand, we
study a stationary model where the users’ aggregate demand does
not fluctuate during each considered time period. Similar stationary
models have been considered in [5, 18, 23]. References [1] and
[6] studied more sophisticated models, where the arrivals of user
requests follow Poisson processes and the systems are modeled by
closed-queueing networks. It is even more challenging to design
and theoretically analyze learning and pricing policies for these
models. As the first study in this direction, our work focuses on the
1In practice, many providers charge users based on their travel distances instead
of their travel times. Given the average vehicle velocity on a link, one can convert
between the two measures of prices.
2We assume that the provider has its own vehicle fleet and has full control over the
supply. In our future work, we are interested in studying providers (e.g., ride-sharing
platforms) who incentivize people to use private vehicles to offer service.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
03
20
5v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  7
 Ju
l 2
02
0
stationary model, and our results may provide guidelines for the
policy design in other more sophisticated models.
We summarize our key contributions as follows.
I. Policy Design. We design a pricing and supply policy that
has different operations on odd and even days. On each odd day, the
provider first estimates the parameters associated with the user de-
mand functions. The estimation is based on the prices implemented
on the prior days and the corresponding demand observed by the
provider. Then, the provider makes the pricing and supply deci-
sions to maximize its payoff as if its estimation is correct. On each
even day, the provider makes decisions by modifying its decisions
on the last odd day. For example, it modifies its prices by adding
offsets. This induces a dispersion between the prices implemented
on the current even day and the last odd day, which facilitates the
provider’s learning of the users’ demand. The sizes of the offsets
decay over days, and the provider can control the decay rate to
balance the exploitation and exploration.
II. Regret Analysis.We compare our policy with a clairvoyant
policy, where the provider is assumed to initially know the users’
demand and makes decisions accordingly. We evaluate our policy
by the time-average regret, which is the difference between the
provider’s expected time-average payoffs under the clairvoyant
policy and our policy. The theoretical analysis of the time-average
regret in our problem is much more challenging than that in some
prior work (e.g., [14, 15]) which studied pricing services with un-
known demand. The reason is that the vehicle flow balance con-
sidered in our problem complicates the provider’s decision making
and makes it difficult to derive closed forms for the pricing and
supply decisions. To tackle the difficulty, we construct a resistor
network given the traffic network (which is inspired by [23]). We
leverage the notion of effective resistances (defined based on the
resistor network) to derive the closed forms for the provider’s deci-
sions. Then, we prove that our policy is a no-regret policy, i.e., as
time goes by, the provider’s time-average payoff under our policy
will converge to that under the clairvoyant policy.
1.2 Related Work
1.2.1 Spatial Pricing of Vehicle Service. There have been some stud-
ies analyzing providers’ spatial pricing decisions, e.g., [1, 2, 5, 19, 23].
Banerjee et al. in [1] used a continuous-time Markov chain to track
the mass of vehicles at each location, and designed pricing policies
with approximation guarantees. Bimpikis et al. in [5] considered
a stationary model with time-invariant user demand, and investi-
gated the impacts of the network topology and demand pattern on
the spatial pricing. Ma et al. in [19] studied a ride-sharing platform’s
problem of dispatching drivers and charging riders, considering
the drivers’ decisions of accepting the dispatching. In our prior
work [23], we analyzed the impact of location-based advertising on
providers’ spatial pricing, and investigated the providers’ optimal
collaboration with advertisers. None of the above studies consid-
ered the spatial pricing with unknown user demand, which is the
focus in this work.
1.2.2 Pricing with Unknown Demand. Our work is closely related
to the stream of research that analyzes service providers’ optimal
pricing with unknown demand, e.g., [4, 7, 9, 14, 15]. Most of the
related work assumed that users’ demand functions belong to a
parametric family and some parameters characterizing the func-
tions are unknown. Service providers iterate between estimating
the parameters and optimizing their prices based on the estimated
models. In terms of the policy design, our work is most related to
[14] and [15], where providers add offsets to prices to create price
dispersions. As discussed before, it is difficult to derive closed forms
for a vehicle service provider’s decisions because of the vehicle flow
balance. The theoretical analysis of our policy is more challenging
than that in [14] and [15].
1.2.3 Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. Our work is also related to the
studies on themulti-armed bandit problem, e.g., [3, 17, 21, 22]. These
studies also analyzed dynamic decision problems with uncertainty,
and considered the exploitation-exploration tradeoff. Different from
our work, these studies did not assume fixed parametric structures
for objective functions. Moreover, most of them considered finite
decision spaces for decision makers. Although a few studies con-
sidered infinite decision spaces, their solutions cannot be applied
to our problem. For example, the solution in [17] requires a convex
objective function, while the vehicle service provider’s objective
function in our problem is non-convex.3
2 MODEL
We consider a monopolistic provider offering vehicle service over
multiple days, which are indexed by d = 1, . . . ,D. In Section 2.1,
we model users’ demand. In Section 2.2, we define the provider’s
decisions, payoff, and policies. In Section 2.3, we introduce a metric
for evaluating the provider’s policies.
2.1 Users’ Demand
We use N ≜ {1, . . . ,N } to denote the set of locations, and assume
that the time within each day d is slotted. Let pdi j denote the vehicle
service price for link (i, j) on day d , where i , j , i, j ∈ N , and pdi j is
measured in dollars per time slot. If a user takes the vehicle service
and travels from i to j, its payment to the provider per time slot is
pdi j .
Given pdi j , we assume that the mass of users who want to travel
from i to j via the vehicle service in each time slot during day d is
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
= αi j − βi jpdi j + ϵdi j ,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N . (1)
Here, αi j and βi j are the demand model parameters. We assume
that 0 < αmin ≤ αi j ≤ αmax and 0 < βmin ≤ βi j ≤ βmax for all
i , j, i, j ∈ N . The provider initially only knows αmin, αmax, βmin,
and βmax, and needs to learn the values of αi j and βi j over time.
The random variable ϵdi j ∈
[
ϵ, ϵ
]
captures the shock in the de-
mand on day d . For each link (i, j), we assume that
{
ϵdi j
}
d=1, ...,D
is a set of independent and identically distributed random variables
with a cumulative distribution function Fi j (·). We further assume
that E
{
ϵdi j
}
= 0. The provider does not know ϵdi j , but knows Fi j (·).
3As we will see in (3), maximizing the provider’s expected payoff is a non-convex
problem if we do not enforce the local supply-demand balance constraint. When using
the solution in [17], we cannot enforce this constraint. This is because enforcing the
constraint requires the provider to estimate the demand model parameters, which is
not included in the solution in [17].
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We assume that there exists a maximum price pmax that the
provider can charge, e.g., due to government regulations [8]. We
further assume that αmin − βmaxpmax + ϵ ≥ 0, which ensures the
demand’s non-negativity.
In (1), the demand is linear in the price, and we consider an
additive demand shock. References [14] and [15] studied the pricing
of products with unknown demand, and considered similar models.
References [5] and [23] studied the pricing of vehicle service with
known demand, and also considered linear demand models. The
linear demand model enables us to theoretically characterize the
performance of our policy and shed light on the design of effective
learning and pricing policies.4 We can easily extend our policy to
other demand models, e.g., the exponential demand model (note
that the theoretical performance analysis will become even more
challenging).
An underlying assumption in (1) is that the demand model pa-
rameters do not change within day d . This is to simplify the nota-
tions and presentation. In practice, users may have quite different
demand patterns during different time periods (e.g., daytime and
nighttime). We can easily generalize our model and solutions by
considering different demand model parameters (e.g., αdayi j , β
day
i j ,
α
night
i j , and β
night
i j ) and pricing decisions (e.g., p
d,day
i j and p
d,night
i j )
for different time periods. For example, the provider can learn αdayi j
and βdayi j by choosing
{
p
d,day
i j
}
d=1, ...,D
.
2.2 Provider’s Decisions, Payoff, and Policies
2.2.1 Decisions. At the beginning of each day d , the provider de-
cides price pdi j for each link (i, j), and announces pdi j to the users.
Meanwhile, the provider decides the vehicle supply for each link.
Specifically, we usewdi j ≥ 0 to denote the mass of vehicles depart-
ing from i to j (i , j) in each time slot during day d . Our work
focuses on the system’s steady state. Hence, when decidingwdi j , the
provider should ensure the following vehicle flow balance [5] [18]:∑
j ∈N\{i }
wdi j =
∑
j ∈N\{i }
wdji ,∀i ∈ N . (2)
For link (i, j), wdi j is the rate that the vehicles depart i , and also
equals the rate that the vehicles arrive at j. Considering all links,
the vehicles’ departure rate at i is
∑
j ∈N\{i }wdi j , and the arrival
rate at i is
∑
j ∈N\{i }wdji . Constraint (2) implies that these two rates
should be equal.
During day d , the randomness in the demand (captured by ϵdi j )
is realized. After observing the demand Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
for each link
(i, j), the provider can update its knowledge about αi j and βi j , and
adjust its pricing and supply decisions on day d + 1 (which will be
discussed in later sections). In practice, the demand may fluctuate
over time during a day, and we use the random variable ϵdi j to
approximate the average fluctuation.
4A linear demand curve can be a reasonable approximation of some other demand
curves. For example, using a linear curve to approximate the demand curve in [12]
can achieve a small mean squared error.
2.2.2 Payoff. Next, we define the provider’s time-average payoff
on dayd in the system’s steady state.We introduce some parameters.
Let ξi j > 0 denote the vehicle travel time on link (i, j). It is defined
as the number of time slots required for a vehicle to travel from i to
j . First, we assume that ξi j is a fixed parameter and does not change
with the users’ demand for taking the provider’s vehicle service (i.e.,
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
). When the provider increases pdi j , Ψ
d
i j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
will
decrease, and some users will not take the provider’s vehicle service.
These users will travel to j by other means (e.g., taking their own
vehicles). Therefore, the impact of Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
on the traffic load
and travel time on (i, j) is negligible. Second, we assume that ξi j
does not change during a day. Similar to αi j and βi j , we can easily
generalize the model by considering different travel times (e.g., ξ dayi j
and ξ nighti j ) for different time periods. Third, we assume that ξi j
does not change over days. This is to simplify the presentation, and
our policy can be generalized to the day-variant travel time case.
We use c > 0 to denote the provider’s cost of supplying a vehi-
cle per time slot. The cost can include the provider’s payment to
the vehicle’s driver and energy cost. Since the cost per time slot
is normally independent of the vehicle’s location, we consider a
homogeneous cost c for different links.5 Our work focuses on the
case where c < pmax, i.e., the cost is smaller than the maximum
price that the provider can charge.
We use the function Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
to denote the provider’s
payoff per time slot on day d in the system’s steady state. Here, we
define pd ≜
(
pdi j ,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N
)
for d = 1, . . . ,D, andwd and ϵd
are defined similarly. Then, we define Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
as follows:
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
≜
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j min
{
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
,wdi j
}
pdi j
−
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi jw
d
i jc . (3)
The provider’s payoff per time slot consists of two parts. The first
part corresponds to the users’ payments. Based on the definition
of Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
in (1), in each time slot, a continuum of users of
mass Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
want to depart from i to j by taking the vehicle
service. Given the provider’s supply decisionwdi j , the actual mass
of users departing from i to j via the vehicle service per time slot
is min
{
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
,wdi j
}
. Therefore, considering the travel time
ξi j , the mass of users traveling on (i, j) via the vehicle service
(i.e., including the users traveling on the link but departing from
i in earlier slots) in any time slot is ξi j min
{
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
,wdi j
}
.
Since the provider gets pdi j by serving each of these users in this
time slot, the first part on the right side of (3) captures the users’
overall payment per time slot. The second part corresponds to the
cost of supplying vehicles. In any time slot, the mass of vehicles
5Mathematically, it is easy to extend the model to the heterogeneous cost case.
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traveling on (i, j) is ξi jwdi j .6 Therefore, the overall cost per time slot
is
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i } ξi jwdi jc .
2.2.3 Policies. At the beginning of day d ≥ 2, the provider knows
the history of the realized demand and its decisions during the past
d − 1 days. We use
(
Ψ1,p1,w1, . . . ,Ψd−1,pd−1,wd−1
)
to denote
this history, where Ψ1, . . . ,Ψd−1 represent the users’ demand on
all links during the first d − 1 days. Note that the provider does not
know the history of the demand shocks (i.e., ϵ1, . . . ,ϵd−1).
We define a policy π as a sequence of functions
(
π 1, . . . ,πD
)
.
Here, π 1 is a constant function, and πd (d ≥ 2) maps the vector(
Ψ1,p1,w1, . . . ,Ψd−1,pd−1,wd−1
)
to the vector
(
pd ,wd
)
, i.e., it
maps the history during the first d − 1 days to the provider’s deci-
sions on day d . Note that
(
pd ,wd
)
should satisfy pdi j ≤ pmax and
wdi j ≥ 0 for all (i, j), and ensure the vehicle flow balance in (2). The
function πd (d ≥ 2) is assumed measurable with respect to the
σ -algebra generated by
(
Ψ1,p1,w1, . . . ,Ψd−1,pd−1,wd−1
)
.
Next, we define the provider’s time-average payoff (i.e., its av-
erage payoff per time slot) during the first D days. Recall that
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
denotes the provider’s time-average payoff on day
d . Given a policy π , the provider’s expected time-average payoff
during the first D days is Eπ
{
1
D
∑D
d=1 Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
, where the
expectation is takenwith respect to the randomvariablesϵ1, . . . ,ϵD
and the (possible) randomness in the policy π .
2.3 Performance Metric
Our target is to design policies for the provider, who initially does
not know the demand model parameters. In order to evaluate the
designed policies, we first assume that the provider knows the
demand model parameters, and define a clairvoyant policy. Then,
we will introduce a metric for evaluating the provider’s policies
based on the clairvoyant policy.
To facilitate the presentation, we define θi j ≜
(
αi j , βi j
)
for each
link (i, j), and let θ ≜ (θi j ,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N ) .
2.3.1 Clairvoyant Policy. When the provider knows θ , it does not
need to adjust decisions over time to learn θ . Under the clairvoyant
policy, the provider solves the following problem on each day d :
maxEϵd
{
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
(4a)
s.t.
∑
j ∈N\{i }
wdi j =
∑
j ∈N\{i }
wdji ,∀i ∈ N , (4b)
wdi j = Eϵdi j
{
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)}
,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N , (4c)
var. pdi j ≤ pmax,wdi j ≥ 0,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N . (4d)
As shown in (4a), the provider makes the decisions to maximize its
expected payoff per time slot on day d , where the expectation is
taken with respect to ϵd . The constraint (4b) ensures the vehicle
6Whenwdi j > Ψ
d
i j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
, some vehicles traveling on (i, j) are empty, i.e., do not
carry users. The provider may intentionally route empty vehicles in the network to
ensure the vehicle flow balance in (2).
flow balance, as discussed in (2).7 The constraint (4c) captures the
local supply-demand balance, meaning that the provider chooses the
vehicle supply (i.e.,wdi j ) to equal the users’ expected demand (i.e.,
Eϵdi j
{
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)}
) on each link. This implies that we consider
the vehicle service in a large city with thousands of links and the
provider simply sets its supply to satisfy the local supply-demand
balance, which simplifies its operation.8 Note thatθ (which includes
the demand model parameters) appears in the expressions of both
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
and Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
. Therefore, the provider needs to
know θ to solve problem (4).
Recall that for each (i, j), ϵ1i j , . . . , ϵDij are independent and iden-
tically distributed. As a result, the provider’s optimal solutions
of
(
pd ,wd
)
to problem (4) for different d are the same. We use
(p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ )) to denote the optimal solution. We include θ in the
notation to indicate that the solution is derived based on the knowl-
edge of θ . Under the clairvoyant policy, the provider’s expected
payoff per time slot on day d is Eϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)}
.
2.3.2 No-Regret Policies. We intend to design policies for the provider
who initially does not know θ and achieve a time-average payoff
that is close to Eϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)}
in the long run.
We evaluate a policy π based on the time-average regret during
the first D days, which is defined as follows:
∆πD≜E
π
{
1
D
D∑
d=1
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) )}
. (5)
The time-average regret ∆πD captures the difference between the
provider’s expected time-average payoffs during the first D days
achieved under the clairvoyant policy and the policy π . In (5), the
expectation is taken with respect to ϵ1, . . . ,ϵD and the possible
randomness in the policy π .
Our work focuses on designing no-regret policies, which are
defined as the policies with limD→∞ ∆πD = 0, i.e., the time-average
payoffs achieved under these policies converge to that achieved
under the clairvoyant policy. We summarize the key notations
(including those introduced in later sections) in Table 1.
3 OUR PRICING AND SUPPLY POLICY
In this section, we introduce our No-Regret Pricing and Supply
(NRPS) policy. In Section 3.1, we explain the method of estimating
the demand model parameters. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we show the
procedure of our policy and discuss its complexity, respectively.
3.1 Estimation of Demand Model Parameters
At the beginning of day d ≥ 2, the information that the provider
has includes the provider’s decisions and the realized demand
during the past d − 1 days. Based on its past pricing decisions
(i.e., p1, . . . ,pd−1) and the corresponding realized demand (i.e.,
7Note that the travel time ξi j does not appear in the flow balance constraint (4b), since
ξi j does not affect the vehicles’ departure rates and arrival rates.
8In our future work, we plan to relax the constraint (4c) and analyze the corresponding
clairvoyant policy. In this case, the provider’s operation is more complex. For example,
even if the expected demand on (i, j) is small, the provider may choose a largewdi j ,
which increases the mass of vehicles available at location j and enables the provider
to serve more users departing from j .
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Table 1: Key Notations.
d = 1, . . . ,D Index of days
i, j ∈ N Index of locations
pdi j Provider’s pricing decision for (i, j) on day d
wdi j Provider’s supply decision for (i, j) on day d
π Provider’s pricing and supply policy
θi j =
(
αi j , βi j
)
Demand model parameters for (i, j)
ϵdi j ∈
[
ϵ, ϵ
]
Demand shock on (i, j) on day d
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
Demand (per time slot) on (i, j) on day d
ξi j Vehicle travel time on (i, j)
c Cost of supplying a vehicle per time slot
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
Provider’s payoff per time slot on day d
∆πD Time-average regret achieved by policy π
θˆdi j =
(
αˆdi j , βˆ
d
i j
)
Estimated demand model parameters for
(i, j) based on the history of the first d days
ρ,η Control parameters used in our policy
Ψ1, . . . ,Ψd−1), the provider can update its estimation of the de-
mand model parameters (i.e., θ ) and make the pricing and supply
decisions for day d accordingly.
For each link (i, j), we use θˆd−1i j =
(
αˆd−1i j , βˆ
d−1
i j
)
to denote the
provider’s estimate of θi j =
(
αi j , βi j
)
given the history of the first
d − 1 days (d ≥ 2). In our policy, the provider computes θˆd−1i j based
on the following least squares estimation:
θ˜d−1i j = arg min(α¯i j , β¯i j )∈R2
d−1∑
τ=1
(
Ψτi j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
−
(
α¯i j − β¯i jpτi j
) )2
, (6)
θˆd−1i j =
(
max
{
min
{
α˜d−1i j ,αmax
}
,αmin
}
,max
{
min
{
β˜d−1i j , βmax
}
, βmin
})
.
(7)
In (6), the provider computes a vector
(
α¯i j , β¯i j
)
that belongs to the
set R2 and minimizes the sum of
(
Ψτi j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
−
(
α¯i j − β¯i jpτi j
))2
over τ = 1, . . . ,d − 1. Here, Ψτi j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
is the realized demand on
link (i, j) on day τ , and α¯i j − β¯i jpτi j is the expected demand on (i, j)
under pτi j when the demand model parameters are α¯i j and β¯i j .
9 We
use θ˜d−1i j to denote the solution vector
(
α¯i j , β¯i j
)
.
Note that θ˜d−1i j belongs to R
2, while θi j lies in the compact
rectangle [αmin,αmax]×[βmin, βmax]. Therefore, in (7), the provider
projects θ˜d−1i j onto the set [αmin,αmax] × [βmin, βmax] to get the
estimate θˆd−1i j .
3.2 Our NRPS Policy
In Policy 1, we show the complete procedure of our NRPS policy,
which includes the parameter estimation introduced in Section 3.1.
3.2.1 Initialization. In line 1, the provider chooses values for θˆ0i j ,
ρ, and η. Let θˆ0i j denote the provider’s estimate of θi j without any
history. Recall that we assume that the provider initially does not
9According to (1), when the demand model parameters are α¯i j and β¯i j , the demand on
(i, j) is α¯i j − β¯i jpτi j + ϵτi j . We can compute the expected demand using E
{
ϵτi j
}
= 0.
Policy 1 No-Regret Pricing and Supply (NRPS) Policy
1: Initialization: For each link (i, j), set θˆ0i j to be a vector ran-
domly picked from set [αmin,αmax]× [βmin, βmax]. Choose con-
trol parameters ρ ∈ (0,∞) and η ∈
(
0, 12
)
.
2: for d = 1, . . . ,D do
3: if d is odd then
4: For each link (i, j), compute θˆd−1i j based on the least
squares estimation method shown in equations (6) and (7).
5: Solve problem (8) to obtain
(
p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−1
))
.
6: For each link (i, j), implement p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
as the pricing
decision andw∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
as the supply decision.
7: else
8: For each link (i, j), implement p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
− ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η
as the pricing decision and w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η as the supply
decision.
9: end if
10: end for
have any prior knowledge of θi j except the feasible region of θi j .
Therefore, for each link (i, j), the provider can choose θˆ0i j by ran-
domly drawing a vector from [αmin,αmax]×[βmin, βmax] (according
to an arbitrary distribution). We use ρ ∈ (0,∞) and η ∈
(
0, 12
)
to
denote two control parameters of our policy. As discussed later,
the provider can tune ρ and η to improve the rate at which the
time-average regret ∆πD converges to zero. The concrete choices of
ρ and η depend on the values of other parameters (e.g., θi j and c).
In Section 5, we will numerically show the impacts of the control
parameters on the policy’s performance.
3.2.2 Operation on Odd Days. The provider’s operation on each
odd day is shown in lines 4-6 of Policy 1. First, the provider com-
putes θˆd−1i j =
(
αˆd−1i j , βˆ
d−1
i j
)
(i.e., estimates demand model param-
eters) for each (i, j) as described in Section 3.1. Note that when
d = 1, θˆd−1i j is simply θˆ
0
i j , which has been chosen in the initializa-
tion. Second, the provider decides its pricing and supply based on
the information of θˆd−1 ≜
(
θˆd−1i j ,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N
)
. The provider’s
decision problem is formulated as follows:
max
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi jEϵdi j
{
min
{
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j + ϵdi j ,wdi j
}}
pdi j
−
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi jw
d
i jc (8a)
s.t.
∑
j ∈N\{i }
wdi j =
∑
j ∈N\{i }
wdji ,∀i ∈ N , (8b)
wdi j = αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j ,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N , (8c)
var. pdi j ≤ pmax,wdi j ≥ 0,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N . (8d)
We get problem (8) by replacing αi j and βi j in problem (4) with
αˆd−1i j and βˆ
d−1
i j , respectively. Specifically, both αi j and βi j appear
in two places of problem (4). First, they appear in the objective
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(4a). According to (1) and (3), αi j and βi j affect the expression
of Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
in (4a). We can replace αi j and βi j in (1) with
αˆd−1i j and βˆ
d−1
i j , plug the result into (3), and take an expectation
with respect to ϵd . This leads to a new objective, i.e., (8a). Second,
αi j and βi j appear in the constraint (4c), because they affect the
expression of Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)
in (1). We can replace αi j and βi j in (1)
with αˆd−1i j and βˆ
d−1
i j , plug the result into (4c), and utilize E
{
ϵdi j
}
= 0
to get a new constraint, i.e., (8c). In problem (8), (8b) and (8d) are
the same as (4b) and (4d), respectively.
Next, we explain the intuition behind the formulation of problem
(8). Since we target to achieve a performance that is close to that un-
der the clairvoyant policy, we formulate problem (8) to be analogous
to problem (4). Because the provider only has the information of
θˆd−1, we get problem (8) by replacing all αi j and βi j in problem (4)
with αˆd−1i j and βˆ
d−1
i j , respectively. We use
(
p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−1
))
to denote the optimal solution to problem (8). Here, we include θˆd−1
in the notation to indicate that the solution is derived based on θˆd−1.
On an odd day d , the provider implements
(
p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−1
))
as its pricing and supply.
3.2.3 Operation on Even Days. The provider’s operation on each
even day is shown in line 8 of Policy 1. Different from the oper-
ation on each odd day, the provider does not update its estimate
of demand model parameters or solve an optimization problem on
each even day. Instead, the provider decides its pricing and supply
by modifying its decisions on the last odd day. Specifically, for an
even day d , the decisions made on the last odd day (i.e., day d − 1)
are captured by
(
p∗
(
θˆd−2
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−2
))
(according to line 5). On
the even day d , the provider implements p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
− ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η as
its pricing andw∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η as its supply for each link (i, j).
Recall that ρ ∈ (0,∞) and η ∈
(
0, 12
)
are the control parameters
chosen in the initialization phase, and βˆd−2i j is the provider’s es-
timate of βi j given the history of the first d − 2 days. Based on
the feasibility of
(
p∗
(
θˆd−2
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−2
))
, we can verify that the
provider’s decisions on each even day are feasible and the supply
decisions ensure the flow balance (we leave the proof to Appendix
A).
Next, we explain the intuition behind the design. When setting
the price for (i, j), the provider adds an offset (i.e., − ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η ) to
p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
. This induces a dispersion between the prices imple-
mented on the odd and even days, which facilitates the provider’s
learning of θi j . The size of the offset is affected by the control pa-
rameters ρ and η, and decays to zero as d approaches infinity. When
η is large, the offset decays at a high rate, which may lead to a slow
learning of θi j . When η is small, the offset decays at a low rate. As
a result, the provider implements “non-optimal” prices on many
even days, which may reduce the provider’s expected time-average
payoff. Therefore, the provider should tune the control parameters
to achieve a good balance between the exploration (i.e., learning
θi j ) and exploitation (i.e., maximizing the payoff). We will show the
impacts of the control parameters in Section 5. When setting the
supply for (i, j), the provider increases the supply fromw∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
to w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η . This is to accommodate the change in the
demand caused by the offset to p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
.
In contrast with our NRPS policy, one can design a myopic pric-
ing and supply policy, where the provider updates its estimate of
θ and solves problem (8) on each day d (without adding offsets to
the prices). In Section 5, we will numerically show that the myopic
policy can lead to an incomplete learning of θ and achieve a worse
performance than our policy.
3.3 Complexity of Our Policy
When implementing our policy, the provider computes θˆd−1 and(
p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−1
))
on each odd day d . First, computing θˆd−1
mainly requires the provider to solve (6), which is a linear regres-
sion problem. In Appendix B, we show that solving (6) is sim-
ple, as it mainly includes a multiplication between a 2 × 2 matrix
and a 2 × 1 vector. Second, computing
(
p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−1
))
requires the provider to solve problem (8). We can utilize con-
straint (8c) to transform problem (8) to a simpler form. Specifi-
cally, we can replace wdi j in (8) with αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j . Recall that
Fi j (·) is the cumulative distribution function of ϵdi j . We define
ϵ−i j as a non-positive parameter that equals
∫ 0
ϵ ϵ
d
i jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
)
, and
simplify the term Eϵdi j
{
min
{
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j + ϵdi j ,wdi j
}}
in (8a) as
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j + ϵ−i j . Then, we can transform problem (8) to the
following problem:
max
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j + ϵ−i j
)
pdi j
−
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j
)
c (9a)
s.t.
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
αˆd−1i j −βˆd−1i j pdi j
)
=
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
αˆd−1ji −βˆd−1ji pdji
)
,∀i ∈ N , (9b)
var. pdi j ≤ pmax,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N . (9c)
Since problem (9) has a quadratic and concave objective function
and affine constraints, it is a convex problem. The provider can
solve (9) by interior-point methods, and usewdi j = αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j pdi j
to determine the supply for each link. Recall that we assume that
αmin − βmaxpmax + ϵ ≥ 0. This ensures the non-negativity of the
determined supply.
4 PERFORMANCE OF OUR POLICY
In this section, we analyze the time-average regret ∆πD achieved
by our NRPS policy. In Section 4.1, we analyze the error of the
provider’s estimation of θ . In Section 4.2, we discuss the main
difficulty of analyzing the ∆πD achieved by our policy. We propose
a solution to tackle the difficulty in Section 4.3, and characterize an
upper bound on ∆πD in Section 4.4.
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4.1 Upper Bound on Squared Estimation Error
Suppose that the provider implements our NRPS policy. Next, we
show that the provider can gradually achieve an accurate estimation
of the demand model parameters. At the beginning of each odd
day d , the provider estimates θi j for each (i, j) based on the history
of the first d − 1 days, and the estimate is denoted by θˆd−1i j . Then,
we can use E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
to characterize the mean squared
error of the provider’s estimate. Here, the expectation is taken with
respect to ϵ1, . . . ,ϵd−1 and the randomness in our NRPS policy
(e.g., in the random setting of θˆ0i j ). In the following theorem, we
characterize an upper bound on E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
.
Theorem 4.1. Under the NRPS policy, there exists a function
Φ1 (ρ,η) such that (i) it is finite and positive for all ρ ∈ (0,∞) and
η ∈
(
0, 12
)
; and (ii) the following relation holds for all d ≥ 5 and all
(i, j):
E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
< Φ1 (ρ,η) ln (d − 1)(d − 1)1−2η . (10)
For all (i, j), E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
approaches zero as d goes to infinity.
The concrete expression of Φ1 (ρ,η) is complicated and can be
found in Appendix C (all the proofs of the results in the paper
can also be found in our appendices). Theorem 4.1 implies that
implementing the NRPS policy can help the provider accurately
estimate θ as d goes to infinity. As d increases, we can see that
under a large η, the rate at which the right side of (10) converges
to zero becomes low. This implies that increasing η can reduce the
rate of learning θ .
4.2 Difficulty of Regret Analysis
In this section, we discuss the difficulty of proving that our NRPS
policy is a no-regret policy. To show that limD→∞ ∆πD = 0 under
the NRPS policy, we plan to first characterize an upper bound on
∆πD , and then prove that the upper bound converges to zero as
D goes to infinity. According to the definition of ∆πD in (5), the
key step of characterizing an upper bound on ∆πD is to bound
Eπ
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
for d = 1, . . . ,D. Re-
call that (p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ )) is determined under the clairvoyant policy,
and is the solution to problem (4). Under our NRPS policy,
(
pd ,wd
)
is determined based on Policy 1. Next, we show that it is challeng-
ing to derive closed-form expressions for both (p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ )) and(
pd ,wd
)
.
Solving problem (4) gives (p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ )). Similar to the transfor-
mation from problem (8) to problem (9) (discussed in Section 3.3), we
can utilize constraint (4c) to transform problem (4) to a simpler form.
Based on (4c), we havewdi j = Eϵdi j
{
Ψdi j
(
pdi j , ϵ
d
i j
)}
= αi j − βi jpdi j for
all (i, j). Then, we can utilize this relation to transform problem (4)
to the following problem:
max
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jpdi j + ϵ−i j
)
pdi j
−
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jpdi j
)
c (11a)
s.t.
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
αi j − βi jpdi j
)
=
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
α ji − βjipdji
)
,∀i ∈ N , (11b)
var. pdi j ≤ pmax,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N . (11c)
Recall that ϵ−i j is defined in Section 3.3 as
∫ 0
ϵ ϵ
d
i jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
)
. In fact,
problem (11) is similar to problem (9), except that problem (11) is
formulated based on the actual demand model parameters (i.e., αi j
and βi j ). From (11), we can see that it is challenging to derive a
closed-form expression for p∗ (θ ). Given p∗ (θ ), we can compute
w∗ (θ ) usingw∗i j (θ ) = αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ). Therefore, it is also hard to
derive a closed-form expression forw∗ (θ ).
Under the NRPS policy, whend is odd,
(
pd ,wd
)
is the solution to
problem (8), denoted by
(
p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
,w∗
(
θˆd−1
))
. Based on our dis-
cussion in Section 3.3, we can transform problem (8) to problem (9),
and solve problem (9) to get p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
. From (9), we can see that it
is also challenging to derive a closed-form expression forp∗
(
θˆd−1
)
.
Since w∗
(
θˆd−1
)
satisfies w∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
= αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
, it
is hard to get a closed-form expression for w∗
(
θˆd−1
)
. Under the
NRPS policy, when d is even,
(
pd ,wd
)
is gotten by modifying the
decisions on the last odd day. As a result, it is also hard to get a
closed-form expression for
(
pd ,wd
)
for an even d .
When we cannot use θ , θˆd−1, and other parameters to repre-
sent (p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ )) and
(
pd ,wd
)
in closed forms, it is difficult to
utilize the bound on E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
in Theorem 4.1 to bound
Eπ
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
. Note that this diffi-
culty does not exist in some earlier work that studied no-regret
pricing policies [14, 15]. For example, the service provider in [15]
essentially sells a single item, and its decision under the pricing
policy can be easily written in a closed form using the estimated
demand model parameters. In our problem, the vehicle service
provider makes the pricing and supply decisions for multiple links,
and these decisions are coupled through the vehicle flow balance
constraint. This makes it difficult to derive closed forms for the
provider’s decisions and further characterize a bound on ∆πD .
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4.3 Effective Resistance-Based Solution
In this section, we tackle the difficulty discussed in Section 4.2.
The key idea is that we can construct a resistor network given the
traffic network, and then utilize the notion of effective resistances
to derive the closed forms of the provider’s decisions.
10We can see that without the flow balance constraints in problems (11) and (9) (i.e.,
constraints (11b) and (9b)), one can easily derive the closed forms of the optimal
solutions.
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Figure 1: An Example of Constructing A Resistor Network for A Traffic Network (When N = 3).
The idea is inspired by our prior work [23], which studied a
vehicle service provider’s pricing in a complete information setting
with location-based advertising. Although the problem in [23] is
quite different from the problem in this paper (as discussed in
Section 1.2), the problem in [23] also requires deriving closed forms
for the optimal prices. Therefore, we use the technique proposed
in [23] (with proper modification) to tackle the difficulty here.
4.3.1 Resistor Network and Effective Resistances. Next, we focus
on deriving the expression for p∗ (θ ), which is the optimal solution
to problem (11). First, we construct a resistor network based on the
traffic network (an example is illustrated in Fig. 1). We can replace
the locations in the traffic network with nodes, and the two links
between each pair of locations with a resistor. Specifically, for all
i, j ∈ N with i < j , we replace the links (i, j) and (j, i)with a resistor,
use ri j to denote its resistance, and let ri j ≜ 1βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξji
. Recall that
βi j , βji , ξi j , and ξ ji are defined under the traffic network (e.g., ξi j is
the vehicle travel time, and βi j is related to the slope of the demand
curve for (i, j)).
In a resistor network, the effective resistance between any two
nodes i and j is defined as the voltage between i and j if a unit
current is injected at i and extracted from j [11]. We use Ri j (β) to
denote the effective resistance between nodes i and j in our con-
structed resistor network. Here, we include β ≜
(
βi j ,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N )
in the notation to indicate the dependence of Ri j (β) on β and dif-
ferentiate Ri j (β) from Ri j
(
βˆd−1
)
, which will be introduced later.
Note that we have Rii (β) = 0 and Ri j (β) = Rji (β) for all i, j ∈ N
[16]. In the example in Fig. 1, we show the computation of R12 (β).
Readers can refer to [16] for more properties of effective resistances.
4.3.2 Closed Forms of (p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ )). In the following proposi-
tion, we characterize p∗ (θ ) (i.e., the solution to problem (11)) using
the effective resistances. Here, we use µ∗i j to denote the optimal
dual variable corresponding to the constraint pdi j ≤ pmax (i.e., (11c))
for each (i, j).
Proposition 4.2. When µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j), we have
p∗i j (θ )=
cβi j+αi j+ϵ
−
i j
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
Rjk (β)−Rik (β)
)
vk (θ ) , (12)
where vk (θ ) is defined as follows:
vk (θ ) ≜
∑
j ∈N\{k }
(
αk j − cβk j − ϵ−k j
)
−
∑
j ∈N\{k }
(
α jk − cβjk − ϵ−jk
)
.
(13)
We will conduct the regret analysis under the assumption that
µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j). Intuitively, under a large pmax, the optimal
solution to problem (11) can satisfy p∗i j (θ ) < pmax for all (i, j). In
this case, we have µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) (based on the complementary
slackness condition). In Appendix E, we prove that the following
condition ensures µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j):∑
k ∈N
|vk (θ )| ≤ min(i, j):i,j,i, j ∈N2
(
βi j +
ξi j
ξ ji
βji
) (
2pmax − c −
αi j + ϵ
−
i j
βi j
)
.
(14)
Given p∗ (θ ) in (12), we can derive the closed form ofw∗ (θ ) using
w∗i j (θ ) = αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ).
4.3.3 Closed Forms of
(
pd ,wd
)
Under Our Policy. Recall that prob-
lem (9) is similar to problem (11), except that problem (9) is for-
mulated based on the estimated demand model parameters (i.e.,
αˆd−1i j and βˆ
d−1
i j ). Therefore, we can apply the same resistance-based
approach to solve problem (9). Specifically, we can construct a new
resistor network, and define the corresponding effective resistances,
i.e., Ri j
(
βˆd−1
)
. We use µˆd−1,∗i j to denote the optimal dual variable
associated with (9c) for each (i, j). Similar to Proposition 4.2, when
µˆd−1,∗i j = 0 for all (i, j), we can derive p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
using βˆd−1i j , αˆ
d−1
i j ,
Rjk
(
βˆd−1
)
, Rik
(
βˆd−1
)
, and vk
(
θˆd−1
)
. Then, we can characterize
the closed forms for the provider’s decisions on the odd and even
days under our NRPS policy.
We will conduct the regret analysis under the assumption that
µˆd−1,∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) and d . In fact, this assumption is not a
necessary condition for proving that our policy is a no-regret policy
(i.e., limD→∞ ∆πD = 0). As shown in Section 5, when µ
∗
i j = 0 for
all (i, j), µˆd−1,∗i j may be positive for some (i, j) at the beginning.
After several days, µˆd−1,∗i j becomes zero for all (i, j), and no longer
changes. In this case, we can still prove that limD→∞ ∆πD = 0. We
explain the reason in Appendix F to save space.
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Based on our discussion above, we can get the closed forms of the
provider’s decisions (e.g., p∗i j (θ ) and p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
) using the effective
resistances. Then, we can leverage the properties of the effective
resistances to compare the provider’s decisions under the clairvoy-
ant policy and our policy. For example, we can utilize Theorem 4.1
to bound |Rjk (β) − Rjk
(
βˆd−1
)
| and |Rik (β) − Rik
(
βˆd−1
)
|, and
further bound |p∗i j (θ ) −p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
|. This enables us to analyze the
time-average regret ∆πD .
4.4 Upper Bound on Time-Average Regret
In this section, we characterize an upper bound on ∆πD , and show
that limD→∞ ∆πD = 0. For both the clairvoyant policy and our
policy, we can plug the closed forms of the provider’s decisions
into (3) to get the provider’s payoff per time slot on day d (i.e.,
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
and the Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
under our policy).
Then, we utilize the bound on E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
in Theorem 4.1
to bound Eπ
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
. Intuitively,
as the provider’s estimate θˆd−1 becomes closer to θ , the expected
gap between Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
and Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
becomes
smaller. We can get ∆πD by taking the average of the expected gap
over d . In the following theorem, we characterize an upper bound
on ∆πD (let e denote the base of the natural logarithm).
Theorem 4.3. Under the NRPS policy, there exist functionsΦ2 (ρ,η),
Φ3 (ρ,η), and Φ4 (ρ,η) such that (i) they are finite and positive for all
ρ ∈ (0,∞) and η ∈
(
0, 12
)
; and (ii) the following relation holds for all
D > 4 + e
1
1−2η :
∆πD < Φ2 (ρ,η)D−1 + Φ3 (ρ,η) (lnD)
1
2 Dη−
1
2 + Φ4 (ρ,η)D−η .
(15)
We can see that if η ∈
(
0, 14
)
, the upper bound of ∆πD in (15)
is O (D−η ); if η ∈ [ 14 , 12 ) , the upper bound is O ((lnD) 12 Dη− 12 ) .
Hence, we can choose η = 14 , which leads to an upper bound of
O
(
(lnD) 12 D− 14
)
.
Based on Theorem 4.3, we can get the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. The NRPS policy is a no-regret policy, i.e., the
policy ensures that limD→∞ ∆πD = 0.
5 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare our policy with several other policies
via numerical experiments, and investigate the impact of the control
parameter η on the performance of our policy.
5.1 Experiment Settings
We compare our NRPS policy with the following four policies:
• Clairvoyant policy:As introduced in Section 2.3.1, the provider
makes decisions based on the complete information of θ .
• Myopic policy: As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the provider
updates its estimate of θ based on (6) and (7), and solves
problem (8) on every day (i.e., the operation under themyopic
policy on each day is the same as the operation under our
policy on each odd day).
• Perturbed myopic policy: It is similar to the myopic policy,
except that the provider further adds offsets to its myopic
optimal pricing and supply solutions. The sizes of the offsets
are similar to those described in line 8 of Policy 1.
• Random policy: The provider estimates θ via random guess-
ing and solves problem (8) on every day.11
We generate
{
ξi j
}
i,j,i, j ∈N using a real-world dataset from DiDi
Chuxing (the largest ride-sharing platform in China), which con-
tains information of the rides taken in November, 2016 in Chengdu,
China [10]. We focus on the rides whose (i) origins and destinations
are within a 4.8 × 4.4 km2 area and (ii) departure time and arrival
time are between 8:30 pm and 11:30 pm on weekdays. We cluster
the origins and destinations into 25 locations (i.e., N = 25), and set
ξi j to be the average travel time of the rides from i to j.
For each link (i, j), we randomly generateαi j and βi j according to
truncated normal distributions (recall that αi j and βi j are bounded).
Specifically, we obtain the distribution of αi j by truncating the
normal distributionN (3.75, 2.25) to interval [3.5, 4], and obtain the
distribution of βi j by truncatingN (2.5, 2.25) to [2, 3]. We randomly
generate each ϵdi j (i , j, i, j ∈ N ,d = 1, . . . ,D) according to a
truncated normal distribution, which is obtained by truncating
N (0, 1) to [−0.5, 0.5].12 We set pmax = 1 and c = 0.1.
5.2 Comparison Between Different Policies
We use random guessing to get the initial estimate of θ under our
NRPS policy, myopic policy, perturbed myopic policy, and random
policy. We choose ρ = 2 and η = 0.45, and show the comparison
between different policies under one experiment in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2(a), we compare the accuracies of estimating θ , and plot
the squared estimation errors (i.e.,
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i } | |θˆD−1i j − θi j | |22 )
under different policies againstD. AsD increases, our policy achieves
a smaller squared estimation error (i.e., a better estimate of θ ). The
random policy keeps guessing θ randomly, and hence its estimate
does not improve over time. The myopic policy achieves an even
worse estimate than the random policy. This is because the myopic
policy does not explore sufficiently many prices and its estimate
can get stuck at an incorrect value due to incomplete learning. The
perturbed myopic policy achieves a similar estimate as our policy,
since adding the offsets to the myopic optimal decisions leads to
more exploration.
In Fig. 2(b), we plot the provider’s time-average payoffs during
the first D days under different policies (i.e., the average is taken
over all the time slots during the first D days). The time-average
payoff under our policy first drops down to a low value when D is
small. This is because when D is small, our policy adds large offsets
to prices on even days to do exploration. Implementing these “non-
optimal” prices reduces the time-average payoff. When D is large,
our policy outperforms the myopic policy and random policy, since
our policy has a better estimate of θ and the offsets added to prices
have decayed to small values. When D is large, the performance
11Recall that the provider initially does not have any prior knowledge of θ except the
feasible region of θ . Under the random policy, the provider uniformly randomly picks
an element from the feasible region of θ as its estimate on each day.
12We plan to evaluate our policy under non-i.i.d. demand shocks in our future work.
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Figure 2: Comparison Between Different Policies.
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Figure 3: Impact of Control Parameter η.
gap between our policy and the clairvoyant policy decreases with
D.
In Fig. 2(b), themyopic policy achieves a higher time-average pay-
off than the random policy. As shown in Fig. 2(a), compared with the
random policy, the myopic policy achieves a worse overall squared
estimation error (i.e., a larger
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i } | |θˆD−1i j − θi j | |22 ). How-
ever, the myopic policy can still well estimate θi j for a few links
by learning from the history (although the estimation for the other
links is much worse). This enables the myopic policy to make better
decisions than the random policy, which estimates all θi j only by
random guessing.
In Fig. 2(b), the perturbed myopic policy has the worst perfor-
mance under a small D, which is due to its frequent exploration of
the solution space. Under a larger D, the perturbed myopic policy
achieves a higher time-average payoff, which is because of its better
estimate of θ and the smaller values of the offsets.
In Section 4.3.3, we claimed that when µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j), we
have µˆD−1,∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) if D is large. In our experiment, we
have checked that (i) µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j), and (ii) µˆD−1,∗i j = 0 for all
(i, j) and D ≥ 473, which verifies our claim.
5.3 Impact of Control Parameter η
In Fig. 3, we investigate the performance of our policy under three
different η, i.e., 2.5, 0.45, and 0.3. Recall that our theoretical results
(e.g., Theorem 4.3) are derived under η < 0.5, and 2.5 is actually
beyond the suggested region of η. We illustrate the performance
under η = 2.5 to show the problem of choosing a large η. In Fig. 3,
the value of ρ is fixed as 2.
In Fig. 3(a), we can see that when η = 2.5, the squared estimation
error is large. Our policy adds offsets to prices on each even day d ,
and the sizes of the offsets are proportional to d−η . When η = 2.5,
the offsets decay at a high rate, leading to less exploration and a
worse estimation. Under a smaller value of η (e.g., 0.45 and 0.3), our
policy can better estimate θ .
In Fig. 3(b), when D is small (e.g., D ≤ 181), the time-average
payoff under our policy increases with η. This is because under a
larger η, our policy adds smaller offsets to prices on even days, and
the negative impact of implementing “non-optimal” prices on the
provider’s payoff is smaller. When D is large, all the offsets under
different η decay to small values. Meanwhile, our policy under a
small η (e.g., 0.45 and 0.3) achieves a better estimation of θ as D
increases (as shown in Fig. 3(a)). In this case, the time-average
payoffs under η = 0.45 and η = 0.3 increase with D. In particular,
the time-average payoff under η = 0.45 is greater than that under
η = 2.5 for D ≥ 201.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
In this work, we studied a vehicle service provider’s spatial pric-
ing and supply with unknown demand. We proposed a policy that
balances exploitation and exploration. To analyze the policy’s per-
formance, we leveraged the connection between the traffic network
10
and a resistor network, and derived closed forms of the decisions
under our policy. We proved that the time-average regret of our
policy over D days can be at most O
(
(lnD) 12 D− 14
)
.
We considered a linear demand model in this work. However, we
can extend our policy to other demand models. For example, given
an exponential demand model [12], we can estimate the demand
model parameters using an exponential regression instead of the
linear regression in (6). In this case, the design of the operations on
odd and even days will be similar to those in our NRPS policy, except
that the provider’s optimization problem on each odd day will
become non-convex. This makes it more difficult to theoretically
analyze the policy’s performance.
There are some other interesting directions to extend our work.
First, as discussed in Section 1.1, we could use a more sophisticated
closed-queueing network to model users’ stochastic demand, and
design learning and pricing policies for the provider. Second, we
could consider a ride-sharing platform, and study its spatial com-
pensation to drivers. Besides learning user demand, the platform
may need to learn drivers’ willingness to work. Third, we are inter-
ested in analyzing the smallest achievable time-average regret for
our problem. Fourth, it is interesting to consider multiple providers
who compete for users and analyze their dynamic pricing strategies.
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A FEASIBILITY OF OPERATION ON EVEN
DAYS
We prove that the provider’s operation on even days under our
NRPS policy is feasible and ensures the vehicle flow balance.
First, we consider the pricing decisions. On an even day d , the
provider’s price for link (i, j) isp∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
− ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η , wherep∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
is the provider’s price on the last odd day. Based on the feasibility
of the prices on the odd days, we have p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
≤ pmax. There-
fore, we also have p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
− ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η ≤ pmax, which shows the
feasibility of the pricing decisions on each even day d .
Second, we consider the supply decisions. On an even day d ,
the provider’s supply for link (i, j) is w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η , where
w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
is the provider’s supply on the last even day. Based on
the feasibility of the supply decisions on the odd days, we have
w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
≥ 0. Moreover, according to the flow balance achieved
on the odd days, we have
∑
j ∈N\{i }
w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
=
∑
j ∈N\{i }
w∗ji
(
θˆd−2
)
,∀i ∈ N . (16)
Therefore, the supply decisions on the even day d satisfy:
w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η ≥ 0,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N , (17)∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
w∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η
)
=
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
w∗ji
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η
)
,∀i ∈ N .
(18)
We can see that the supply decisions on each even day d are feasible
and ensure the vehicle flow balance.
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B SOLUTION TO EQUATION (6)
We introduce the solution to (6). First, we show that
∑d−1
τ=1
(
Ψτi j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
−(
α¯i j − β¯i jpτi j
) )2
is a convex function of
(
α¯i j , β¯i j
)
. We can derive
the Hessian matrix of the function as

2 (d − 1) −2∑d−1τ=1 pτi j
−2∑d−1τ=1 pτi j 2∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j )2
 . (19)
In our NRPS policy, we run the least squares estimation on each
odd day d ≥ 3 (when d = 1, the estimation is given by the policy’s
initialization phase). Therefore, we have d − 1 > 0 when solving (6).
Next, we analyze the leading principal minor of the Hessian matrix
of order 2. We can easily derive the following relation:
(d − 1)
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − (d−1∑
τ=1
pτi j
)2
=
1
2
d−1∑
τ=1
d−1∑
ν=1
(
pτi j − pνi j
)2
. (20)
In our NRPS policy, we create a dispersion between the prices on odd
and even days. For example, we havep2i j−p1i j = −
ρ
βˆ 0i j
2−η < 0. There-
fore, the value of 12
∑d−1
τ=1
∑d−1
ν=1
(
pτi j − pνi j
)2
in (20) is positive. Then,
we can see that the Hessian matrix in (19) is positive definite, which
implies that the function
∑d−1
τ=1
(
Ψτi j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
−
(
α¯i j − β¯i jpτi j
) )2
is
convex.
Based on the convexity of the function,
(
α˜d−1i j , β˜
d−1
i j
)
should
satisfy the following equations:
− 2
d−1∑
τ=1
(
Ψτi j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
−
(
α˜d−1i j − β˜d−1i j pτi j
) )
= 0, (21)
2
d−1∑
τ=1
pτi j
(
Ψτi j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
−
(
α˜d−1i j − β˜d−1i j pτi j
) )
= 0. (22)
After rearrangement, we have

d − 1 −∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j −
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 
[
α˜d−1i j
β˜d−1i j
]
=

∑d−1
τ=1 Ψ
τ
i j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi jΨ
τ
i j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
))  .
(23)
We can check that the coefficient matrix above is invertible. Specif-
ically, we can compute the determinant as
− (d − 1)
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2
+
(d−1∑
τ=1
pτi j
)2
= −12
d−1∑
τ=1
d−1∑
ν=1
(
pτi j − pνi j
)2
. (24)
According to our discussion for (20), the determinant above is nega-
tive. Hence, the coefficient matrix in (23) is invertible and its inverse
can be computed as
d − 1 −∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j −
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 
−1
= − 2∑d−1
τ=1
∑d−1
ν=1
(
pτi j − pνi j
)2  −
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 ∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
−∑d−1τ=1 pτi j d − 1
 .
(25)
Then, we can compute
[
α˜d−1i j
β˜d−1i j
]
as follows:[
α˜d−1i j
β˜d−1i j
]
= − 2∑d−1
τ=1
∑d−1
ν=1
(
pτi j − pνi j
)2  −
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 ∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
−∑d−1τ=1 pτi j d − 1

·

∑d−1
τ=1 Ψ
τ
i j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi jΨ
τ
i j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
))  . (26)
Therefore, solving (6) mainly includes a multiplication between a
2 × 2 matrix and a 2 × 1 vector.
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Theorem 4.1 characterizes the bound of E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
under
our policy. Recall that the provider gets θˆd−1i j from (6) and (7). In
(6), the provider gets θ˜d−1i j via least squares estimation. In (7), the
provider projects θ˜d−1i j onto [αmin,αmax]×[βmin, βmax] to get θˆd−1i j .
Since θi j lies in [αmin,αmax] × [βmin, βmax], we have the following
relation:
E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
≤ E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
. (27)
In the following, we characterize an upper bound onE
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
,
and the upper bound will also be a bound on E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
.
The proof in the following is similar to that in [15] (some details are
different). Note that the proofs of other results in our paper (e.g.,
Theorem 4.3) are completely different from those in [15].
Step 1:We derive the expression for E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
.
Based on (23) in our analysis in Appendix B, we have the follow-
ing relation:
d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 
[
α˜d−1i j
−β˜d−1i j
]
=

∑d−1
τ=1 Ψ
τ
i j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi jΨ
τ
i j
(
pτi j , ϵ
τ
i j
)) 
=

∑d−1
τ=1
(
αi j − βi jpτi j + ϵτi j
)
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
(
αi j − βi jpτi j + ϵτi j
)) 
=

d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 
[
αi j
−βi j
]
+
[ ∑d−1
τ=1 ϵ
τ
i j∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi jϵ
τ
i j
) ] .
(28)
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After rearrangement, we have the following result:[
α˜d−1i j − αi j
−β˜d−1i j + βi j
]
=

d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 
−1 [ ∑d−1
τ=1 ϵ
τ
i j∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi jϵ
τ
i j
) ] . (29)
Note that in our analysis in Appendix B, we have proved that
(d − 1)∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j )2 − (∑d−1τ=1 pτi j )2 > 0 for any d ≥ 3. Hence,
d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2  is invertible for any d ≥ 3. We define
a matrix ζd−1 and a vector εd−1 as follows (we omit the subscript
ij to simplify the notation):
ζd−1 ≜

d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2  , εd−1 ≜
[ ∑d−1
τ=1 ϵ
τ
i j∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi jϵ
τ
i j
) ] .
(30)
Then, we can see that
E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
= E
{
| |
[
α˜d−1i j − αi j , β˜d−1i j − βi j
]
| |22
}
= E
{
| |
[
α˜d−1i j − αi j ,−β˜d−1i j + βi j
]
| |22
}
= E
{
| |
[
α˜d−1i j − αi j ,−β˜d−1i j + βi j
]T | |22}
= E
{ | |ζ−1d−1εd−1 | |22} . (31)
Furthermore, we can see that when d ≥ 3, the matrix ζd−1 is
symmetric, positive definite, and invertible.
Step 2:We split E
{
| |ζ−1d−1εd−1 | |22
}
into two parts.
Sinceζd−1 is positive definite, it can bewritten asQ
[
λ1 0
0 λ2
]
Q−1,
where λ1 and λ2 are the eigenvalues of ζd−1 and the columns
of Q comprise an orthonormal basis of the eigenvectors of ζd−1.
Furthermore, we have QTQ = QQT = I2, where I2 is the 2 × 2
identity matrix. The inverse of ζd−1 (i.e., ζ−1d−1) can be written as
Q
[ 1
λ1
0
0 1λ2
]
Q−1.
We can further prove thatQ
[ √
λ1 0
0
√
λ2
]
Q−1 is positive def-
inite and the following relation holds:
Q
[ √
λ1 0
0
√
λ2
]
Q−1
(
Q
[ √
λ1 0
0
√
λ2
]
Q−1
)
= ζd−1. (32)
Then, we can compute ζ
1
2
d−1 and ζ
− 12
d−1 as
ζ
1
2
d−1 = Q
[ √
λ1 0
0
√
λ2
]
Q−1, (33)
ζ
− 12
d−1 = Q
[ 1√
λ1
0
0 1√
λ2
]
Q−1. (34)
Considering (31), we have the following relation:
E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
= E
{| |ζ−1d−1εd−1 | |22} = E {| |ζ− 12d−1ζ− 12d−1εd−1 | |22} .
(35)
Note that ζ−
1
2
d−1 is a 2 × 2 matrix and ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1 is a 2 × 1 vector.
We use | |ζ−
1
2
d−1 | |op to denote the operator norm of the matrix ζ
− 12
d−1.
Then, we have
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1 | |op = sup
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1x | |2 : x ∈ R2×1 with | |x | |2 = 1
}
. (36)
Hence, for any given y ∈ R2×1 with | |y | |2 = 1, we have
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1y | |2 ≤ ||ζ
− 12
d−1 | |op. (37)
We can plug y = ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1
| |ζ −
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |2
into the above inequality and have
1
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |2
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1 | |2 ≤ ||ζ
− 12
d−1 | |op. (38)
After rearrangement and taking the square on both sides, we get
the following inequality:
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1 | |22 ≤ ||ζ
− 12
d−1 | |2op | |ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1 | |22 . (39)
According to the property of the operator norm, | |ζ−
1
2
d−1 | |2op equals
the larger eigenvalue of
(
ζ
− 12
d−1
)T
ζ
− 12
d−1. Based on (34) and the eigen-
decomposition of ζ−1d−1, we can see that | |ζ
− 12
d−1 | |2op also equals the
larger eigenvalue of ζ−1d−1, which is the reciprocal of the smaller
eigenvalue of ζd−1.
Considering (35), (39), and the above discussion, we have
E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
= E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
≤ 1the smaller eigenvalue of ζd−1
E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
. (40)
Hence, we have split the upper bound of E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
to
two parts, i.e., 1the smaller eigenvalue of ζd−1 and E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
.
We will characterize the upper bounds of them separately.
Step 3: In this step, we characterize a lower bound for the
smaller eigenvalue of ζd−1, which will be an upper bound for
1
the smaller eigenvalue of ζd−1 .
Recall that ζd−1 is defined as

d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2  . Let
λL and λS denote the larger and smaller eigenvalues of ζd−1, re-
spectively. Then, λL and λS are the two solutions to the following
equation:
det ©­«

d − 1 − λ ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − λ
ª®¬ = 0. (41)
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After rearrangement, we have
λ2 −
(
d − 1 +
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2)
λ + (d − 1)
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − (d−1∑
τ=1
pτi j
)2
= 0.
(42)
Hence, λL and λS satisfy the following relations:
λLλS = (d − 1)
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − (d−1∑
τ=1
pτi j
)2
, (43)
λL + λS = d − 1 +
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2
. (44)
Next, we rearrange the expression for λLλS . We define p¯d−1i j ≜
1
d−1
∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j , and can get the following relation:
λLλS = (d − 1)
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − (d−1∑
τ=1
pτi j
)2
= (d − 1)
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2
.
(45)
Since ζd−1 is positive definite, both λL and λS are positive. Hence,
λL < d − 1 +∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j )2. We can derive the following result for
λS :
λS =
(d − 1)∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j − p¯d−1i j )2
λL
>
(d − 1)∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j − p¯d−1i j )2
d − 1 +∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j )2 (46)
Next, we prove the existence of an upper bound of |pτi j | for all
(i, j) and τ = 1, . . . ,D under our policy. Under our policy, the
prices on the odd days are determined by solving problem (8) (or
equivalently, problem (9)), and the prices on the even days are
determined by modifying the prices on the odd days. It is easy to
see that all the prices under our policy are upper-bounded by pmax.
From problem (9), we can see that the optimal prices obtained by
solving problem (9) are also lower-bounded. We can prove this
by contradiction. Suppose that the provider charges prices with
negative infinite values on some links. The provider’s overall payoff
associated with these links has a negative infinite value. Since the
provider’s overall payoff associated with other links in the network
is upper-bounded due to the quadratic shape of the payoff function,
the provider’s overall payoff has a negative infinite value. This
implies that charging prices with negative infinite values is strictly
dominated by charging prices that generate finite payoff values.
In other words, the optimal prices obtained by solving problem
(9) are lower-bounded. Then, we can easily see that the prices on
odd and even days under our policy are lower-bounded. Because
the prices under our policy are both lower-bounded and upper-
bounded, we can use pup to denote an upper bound of |pτi j | for all
(i, j) and τ = 1, . . . ,D.
Based on (46) and the definition of pup, we have
λS >
(d − 1)∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j − p¯d−1i j )2
d − 1 +∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j )2 >
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2
1 + p2up
. (47)
Next, we derive a lower bound of
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2
. When d ≥ 3,
we can derive the lower bound as follows:
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2 ≥ ⌊ d−12 ⌋∑
τ=1
((
p2τ−1i j − p¯d−1i j
)2
+
(
p2τi j − p¯d−1i j
)2)
≥
⌊ d−12 ⌋∑
τ=1
1
2
(
p2τ−1i j − p¯d−1i j − p2τi j + p¯d−1i j
)2
=
⌊ d−12 ⌋∑
τ=1
1
2
(
p2τ−1i j − p2τi j
)2
. (48)
Under our policy, we have p2τ−1i j −p2τi j =
ρ
βˆ 2τ−2i j
(2τ )−η for τ = 1, . . ..
Hence, we can further derive the following inequality:
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2 ≥ ρ22−2η
2β2max
⌊ d−12 ⌋∑
τ=1
τ−2η ≥ ρ
22−2η
2β2max
∫ ⌊ d−12 ⌋+1
1
z−2ηdz
=
ρ22−2η
2β2max
1
1 − 2η
((
⌊d − 12 ⌋ + 1
)1−2η
− 1
)
.
(49)
Recall that η ∈
(
0, 12
)
and d ≥ 5 (which is the condition of Theorem
4.1). We can further derive the following result:
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2
>
ρ22−2η
2β2max
1
1 − 2η
((
⌊d − 12 ⌋
)1−2η
− 1
)
≥ ρ
22−2η
2β2max
1
1 − 2η
©­­«
(
⌊d − 12 ⌋
)1−2η
−
(
⌊ d−12 ⌋
)1−2η
21−2η
ª®®¬
=
ρ22−2η
2β2max
1
1 − 2η
(
⌊d − 12 ⌋
)1−2η (
1 − 22η−1
)
.
(50)
To conclude, the smaller eigenvalue of ζd−1 is lower-bounded by
λS >
1
1 + p2up
ρ22−2η
2β2max
1
1 − 2η
(
⌊d − 12 ⌋
)1−2η (
1 − 22η−1
)
. (51)
Step 4:We derive an upper bound for E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
.
Recall that εd−1 is defined as εd−1 =
[ ∑d−1
τ=1 ϵ
τ
i j∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi jϵ
τ
i j
) ] . When
d ≥ 3, we have the following relation:
εd−1 = εd−2 +
[
ϵd−1i j
pd−1i j ϵ
d−1
i j
]
. (52)
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Then, we can expand the expression of E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
as follows:
E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
= E
{(
ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1
)T
ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1
}
= E
{
εTd−1
(
ζ
− 12
d−1
)T
ζ
− 12
d−1εd−1
}
(a)
= E
{
εTd−1ζ
−1
d−1εd−1
}
= E
©­«εTd−2 +
[
ϵd−1i j
pd−1i j ϵ
d−1
i j
]T ª®¬ζ−1d−1
(
εd−2 +
[
ϵd−1i j
pd−1i j ϵ
d−1
i j
])
= E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
+ E

[
ϵd−1i j
pd−1i j ϵ
d−1
i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[
ϵd−1i j
pd−1i j ϵ
d−1
i j
]
+ E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]
ϵd−1i j
}
+ E
{
ϵd−1i j
[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1εd−2
}
(b)
= E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
+ E

[
ϵd−1i j
pd−1i j ϵ
d−1
i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[
ϵd−1i j
pd−1i j ϵ
d−1
i j
] .
(53)
Here, the equality (a) is based on the decompositions of ζ−
1
2
d−1 and
ζ−1d−1. The equality (b) is based on the fact that ϵ
d−1
i j is an indepen-
dent and identically distributed random variable with E
{
ϵd−1i j
}
= 0.
We can further rearrange the expression of E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
as
follows:
E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
= E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
+ E
{[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
.
(54)
In the following, we derive upper bounds for the two components
of E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
.
(Step 4-A) First, we derive an upper bound forE
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
.
Recall that ζd−1 is defined as

d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2  . Then,
we can derive the following expression:
ζ−1d−1 =

d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 
−1
=
©­«ζd−2 +

1 pd−1i j
pd−1i j
(
pd−1i j
)2 ª®¬
−1
=
(
ζd−2 +
[ 1
pd−1i j
] [
1 pd−1i j
] )−1
=ζ−1d−2 −
ζ−1d−2
[ 1
pd−1i j
] [
1 pd−1i j
]
ζ−1d−2
1 +
[
1 pd−1i j
]
ζ−1d−2
[ 1
pd−1i j
] . (55)
Here, the last equality is based on the Sherman-Morrison formula.
Then, we can derive an upper bound for E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
as fol-
lows:
E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
=E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−2εd−2
}
−E

εTd−2ζ
−1
d−2
[ 1
pd−1i j
] [
1 pd−1i j
]
ζ−1d−2εd−2
1 +
[
1 pd−1i j
]
ζ−1d−2
[ 1
pd−1i j
]

=E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−2εd−2
}
− E

| |
[
1 pd−1i j
]
ζ−1d−2εd−2 | |22
1 +
[
1 pd−1i j
]
ζ−1d−2
[ 1
pd−1i j
]

.
(56)
Sinceζ−1d−2 is positive definite, we have
[
1 pd−1i j
]
ζ−1d−2
[ 1
pd−1i j
]
>
0. Therefore, we can derive the following relation:
E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
≤ E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−2εd−2
}
. (57)
(Step 4-B) Second, we derive an upper bound for the expres-
sion E
{[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
. Recall that ζd−1
is defined as

d − 1 ∑d−1τ=1 pτi j∑d−1
τ=1 p
τ
i j
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2  . We can compute ζ−1d−1
as follows:
ζ−1d−1=
1
(d−1)∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j )2− (∑d−1τ=1 pτi j )2

∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 −∑d−1τ=1 pτi j
−∑d−1τ=1 pτi j d − 1
 .
(58)
We define Jd−1 ≜
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − 1d−1 (∑d−1τ=1 pτi j )2. According to
our prior proof, we have
Jd−1 =
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − 1
d − 1
(d−1∑
τ=1
pτi j
)2
=
d−1∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2
. (59)
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Note that p¯d−1i j is defined before (45). Since p
2
i j is different from
p1i j , the value of Jd−1 is positive for any d ≥ 3. By plugging the
expression of ζ−1d−1 and rearranging the result using Jd−1, we can
rewrite E
{[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
as follows:
E
{[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
=E

(d − 1)
(
pd−1i j − p¯d−1i j
)2
+ Jd−1
(d − 1) Jd−1
 E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
. (60)
Next, we prove that
(
pd−1i j − p¯d−1i j
)2 ≤ Jd−1− Jd−2. We can compute
Jd−1 − Jd−2 −
(
pd−1i j − p¯d−1i j
)2
as follows:
Jd−1 − Jd−2 −
(
pd−1i j − p¯d−1i j
)2
=
(
pd−1i j − p¯d−1i j
)2
+
d−2∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2
−
d−2∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−2i j
)2 − (pd−1i j − p¯d−1i j )2
=
d−2∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−1i j
)2 − d−2∑
τ=1
(
pτi j − p¯d−2i j
)2
=
(
p¯d−2i j − p¯d−1i j
) d−2∑
τ=1
(
2pτi j − p¯d−1i j − p¯d−2i j
)
= (d − 2)
(
p¯d−2i j − p¯d−1i j
)2 ≥ 0. (61)
Hence, we have
(
pd−1i j − p¯d−1i j
)2 ≤ Jd−1 − Jd−2. This implies the
following relation:
E
{[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
≤E
{ (d − 1) (Jd−1 − Jd−2) + Jd−1
(d − 1) Jd−1
}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
=E
{
1 − Jd−2
Jd−1
+
1
d − 1
}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
. (62)
(Step 4-C) Third, we combine the results derived in Step 4-A and
Step 4-B. Recall that E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
equals E
{
εTd−1ζ
−1
d−1εd−1
}
,
and it includes the following two terms: E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
and
E
{[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
. According to Step 4-
A, we have
E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−1εd−2
}
≤ E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−2εd−2
}
. (63)
According to Step 4-B, we have
E
{[ 1
pd−1i j
]T
ζ−1d−1
[ 1
pd−1i j
]}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
≤E
{
1 − Jd−2
Jd−1
+
1
d − 1
}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
. (64)
Therefore, we have
E
{
εTd−1ζ
−1
d−1εd−1
} ≤ E {εTd−2ζ −1d−2εd−2} + E {1 − Jd−2Jd−1 + 1d − 1
}
E
{(
ϵd−1i j
)2}
.
(65)
We can repeatedly apply similar inequalities:
E
{
εTd−2ζ
−1
d−2εd−2
} ≤ E {εTd−3ζ −1d−3εd−3} + E {1 − Jd−3Jd−2 + 1d − 2
}
E
{(
ϵd−2i j
)2}
,
. . .
E
{
εT3 ζ
−1
3 ε3
} ≤ E {εT2 ζ −12 ε2} + E {1 − J2J3 + 13
}
E
{(
ϵ 3i j
)2}
.
We can take the summation over the right sides and left sides of
all these inequalities, and get the following inequality:
E
{
εTd−1ζ
−1
d−1εd−1
}
≤ E
{
εT2 ζ
−1
2 ε2
}
+
d−1∑
k=3
E
{
1 − Jk−1
Jk
+
1
k
}
E
{(
ϵki j
)2}
.
(66)
Note that ε2 is defined as ε2 =
[
ϵ1i j + ϵ
2
i j
p1i jϵ
1
i j + p
2
i jϵ
2
i j
]
and ζ−12 equals
the following expression (based on (58)):
ζ−12 =
1
2
∑2
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2− (∑2τ=1 pτi j )2

∑2
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 −∑2τ=1 pτi j
−∑2τ=1 pτi j 2
 .
(67)
We can verify that E
{
εT2 ζ
−1
2 ε2
}
= E
{(
ϵ1i j
)2
+
(
ϵ2i j
)2}
. Recall that{
ϵki j
}
k=1, ...,D
is a set of independent and identically distributed
random variables with ϵki j ∈
[
ϵ, ϵ
]
for all (i, j) andd . We can see that
E
{(
ϵki j
)2}
has the same value for different (i, j) and k . Furthermore,
since E
{
ϵki j
}
= 0, we can see that
E
{(
ϵki j
)2}
= Var
{
ϵki j
}
+
(
E
{
ϵki j
})2
= Var
{
ϵki j
}
≤ 14
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 ,
(68)
where the last inequality is based on the Popoviciu’s inequality.
Therefore, we can derive the following result based on (66):
E
{
εTd−1ζ
−1
d−1εd−1
}
≤ 12
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 + 14 (ϵ − ϵ )2 d−1∑
k=3
E
{
1 − Jk−1
Jk
+
1
k
}
.
(69)
Next, we derive upper bounds for
∑d−1
k=3 E
{
1 − Jk−1Jk
}
and
∑d−1
k=3 E
{ 1
k
}
.
First, we can see that
d−1∑
k=3
E
{
1 − Jk−1
Jk
}
=
d−1∑
k=3
E
{
Jk − Jk−1
Jk
}
=
d−1∑
k=3
∫ Jk
Jk−1
dz
Jk
. (70)
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From (61), we can see that Jk − Jk−1 ≥
(
pki j − p¯ki j
)2 ≥ 0. Hence, we
can further derive the following result:
d−1∑
k=3
E
{
1 − Jk−1
Jk
}
≤
d−1∑
k=3
∫ Jk
Jk−1
dz
z
=
∫ Jd−1
J2
dz
z
= ln Jd−1 − ln J2.
(71)
Note that Jd−1 =
∑d−1
τ=1
(
pτi j
)2 − 1d−1 (∑d−1τ=1 pτi j )2 ≤ ∑d−1τ=1 (pτi j )2 ≤
(d − 1)p2up and J2 =
(
p1i j
)2
+
(
p2i j
)2− 12 (p1i j + p2i j )2 = 12 (p1i j − p2i j )2 =
1
2
(
ρ
βˆ 0i j
2−η
)2
= 12
ρ2(
βˆ 0i j
)2 2−2η . We can get the following inequality:
d−1∑
k=3
E
{
1 − Jk−1
Jk
}
≤ ln
(
(d − 1)p2up
)
− ln ©­­«
1
2
ρ2(
βˆ0i j
)2 2−2ηª®®¬
≤ ln
(
(d − 1)p2up
)
− ln
(
1
2
ρ2
β2max
2−2η
)
. (72)
Second, we derive an upper bound for
∑d−1
k=3 E
{ 1
k
}
. We can see that
the following result holds:
d−1∑
k=3
E
{
1
k
}
=
d−1∑
k=3
∫ k+1
k
dz
k
≤
d−1∑
k=3
∫ k+1
k
dz
z − 1
=
∫ d
3
dz
z − 1 = ln (d − 1) − ln 2 < ln (d − 1) . (73)
According to the above results and the fact that 1 < ln (d − 1)
when d ≥ 5, we can derive an upper bound on E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
as follows:
E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
≤ 12
(
ϵ − ϵ )2
+
1
4
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 (ln ((d − 1)p2up) − ln ( 12 ρ2β2max 2−2η
)
+ ln (d − 1)
)
=
1
4
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 (2 + ln (p2up) − ln ( ρ2
β2max
2−2η−1
)
+ 2 ln (d − 1)
)
=
1
2
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 (1 + ln pupβmax2η+0.5
ρ
+ ln (d − 1)
)
≤ 12
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 ((1 + ln pupβmax2η+0.5ρ

)
ln (d − 1) + ln (d − 1)
)
=
1
2
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 (2 + ln pupβmax2η+0.5ρ

)
ln (d − 1) . (74)
Step 5:We derive an upper bound for E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
.
According to (40) of Step 2, we can split an upper bound of
E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
into two parts:
E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
≤ 1
λS
E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
. (75)
According to Step 3, we have
1
λS
<
(
1 + p2up
) 2β2max
ρ22−2η
(1 − 2η)
(
⌊d − 12 ⌋
)2η−1 1
1 − 22η−1
=
(
1 + p2up
) β2max
ρ2
(1 − 2η)
(
1
⌊ d−12 ⌋
)1−2η
4
21−2η − 1 . (76)
Since ⌊ d−12 ⌋ ≥ d−14 for d ≥ 5 and η < 12 , we further have the
following inequality:
1
λS
<
(
1 + p2up
) β2max
ρ2
(1 − 2η)
(
4
d − 1
)1−2η 4
21−2η − 1 . (77)
According to Step 4, we have
E
{
| |ζ−
1
2
d−1εd−1 | |22
}
≤ 12
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 (2 + ln pupβmax2η+0.5ρ

)
ln (d − 1) .
Then, we can derive an upper bound for E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
as:
E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
<
(
1 + p2up
) β2max
ρ2
(1 − 2η)
(
4
d − 1
)1−2η 4
21−2η − 1
· 12
(
ϵ − ϵ )2 (2 + ln pupβmax2η+0.5ρ

)
ln (d − 1)
=
(
1 + p2up
) β2max
ρ2
(1 − 2η) 4
1.5−2η
21−2η − 1
· (ϵ − ϵ )2 (2 + ln pupβmax2η+0.5ρ

)
ln (d − 1)
(d − 1)1−2η .
(78)
Therefore, we can define Φ1 (ρ,η) as follows:
Φ1 (ρ,η) ≜
(
1 + p2up
) β2max
ρ2
(1 − 2η) 4
1.5−2η
21−2η − 1
· (ϵ − ϵ )2 (2 + ln pupβmax2η+0.5ρ

)
. (79)
We can see that Φ1 (ρ,η) is finite and positive for all ρ ∈ (0,∞) and
η ∈
(
0, 12
)
. Furthermore, Φ1 (ρ,η) ln(d−1)(d−1)1−2η is an upper bound on
E
{
| |θ˜d−1i j − θi j | |22
}
. Based on our discussion at the beginning of our
proof in this section, Φ1 (ρ,η) ln(d−1)(d−1)1−2η is also an upper bound on
E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
.
According to L’Hospital’s rule, we can see that as d goes to
infinity, we have
lim
d→∞
Φ1 (ρ,η) ln (d − 1)(d − 1)1−2η = limd→∞Φ1 (ρ,η)
1
d−1
(1 − 2η) (d − 1)−2η
= lim
d→∞
Φ1 (ρ,η) 1(1 − 2η) (d − 1)1−2η = 0. (80)
Since Φ1 (ρ,η) ln(d−1)(d−1)1−2η is an upper bound on E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
,
we can see that E
{
| |θˆd−1i j − θi j | |22
}
approaches zero as d goes to
infinity. This completes our proof.
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D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.2
Recall that problem (11) is as follows:
max
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jpdi j + ϵ−i j
)
pdi j
−
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jpdi j
)
c (81a)
s.t.
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
αi j − βi jpdi j
)
=
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
α ji − βjipdji
)
,∀i ∈ N , (81b)
var. pdi j ≤ pmax,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N . (81c)
First, we can see that the problem is a convex problem. Specifi-
cally, the objective function is a quadratic and concave function of
the pricing decisions, and the flow balance constraints are affine.
Hence, the KKT conditions are sufficient and necessary for optimal-
ity. Recall that we use µ∗i j to denote the optimal dual variable associ-
ated with pdi j ≤ pmax for each (i, j). We further use σ ∗i to denote the
optimal dual variable associated with
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
αi j − βi jpdi j
)
=∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
α ji − βjipdji
)
for each i .
Second, according to the stationarity condition, we have the
following relation:
− ξi j
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) + ϵ−i j
)
+ ξi jβi jp
∗
i j (θ ) − ξi jβi jc
− σ ∗i βi j + σ ∗j βi j + µ∗i j = 0. (82)
After rearrangement, we can get the following result for each (i, j):
p∗i j (θ ) =
ξi jαi j + ξi jϵ
−
i j + ξi jβi jc +
(
σ ∗i − σ ∗j
)
βi j − µ∗i j
2ξi jβi j
. (83)
When µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j), we have
p∗i j (θ ) =
ξi jαi j + ξi jϵ
−
i j + ξi jβi jc +
(
σ ∗i − σ ∗j
)
βi j
2ξi jβi j
=
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
σ ∗i − σ ∗j
2ξi j
. (84)
Third, we prove that
{
σ ∗i
}
i ∈N satisfies a system of linear equa-
tions, whose coefficient matrix is a Laplacian matrix. Note that
p∗i j (θ ) satisfies the flow balance constraints. Hence, we can plug
the expression of p∗i j (θ ) in (84) into the flow balance constraints,
and get the following relation:
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
αi j − βi j
(
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
σ ∗i − σ ∗j
2ξi j
))
=
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
α ji − βji
(
α ji + ϵ
−
ji + βjic
2βji
+
σ ∗j − σ ∗i
2ξ ji
))
,∀i ∈ N .
(85)
After rearrangement, we can get the following result for all i ∈ N :∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξ ji
) (
σ ∗i − σ ∗j
)
=
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
αi j − ϵ−i j − βi jc
)
−
∑
j ∈N\{i }
(
α ji − ϵ−ji − βjic
)
= vi (θ ) . (86)
Recall that function vi (θ ) is defined in Proposition 4.2. Then, we
define a matrix L, whose ij-th entry is defined as
li j ≜

∑
k ∈N\{i }
(
βik
ξik
+
βki
ξki
)
, if i = j,
− βi jξi j −
βji
ξ ji
, if i , j .
(87)
We further defineσ∗ ≜
(
σ ∗i ,∀i ∈ N
)T
andv (θ ) ≜ (vi (θ ) ,∀i ∈ N)T ,
which are two column vectors. We can rewrite (86) as follows:
Lσ∗ = v (θ ) . (88)
Note that L is the Laplacian matrix of a weighted undirected graph.
Specifically, there exists an edge (i, j) between any two different
nodes i and j, and edge (i, j) is associated with a weight, which is
βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξ ji
.
Fourth, we show that the generalized inverse of the Laplacian
matrix L has a strong connection with a resistor network. Since
L is an N × N Laplacian matrix, the rank of L is N − 1, and L is
non-invertible. As a substitute for the inverse, we can consider the
generalized inverse of L [11], and denote it by L+. Using the notion
of L+, we can prove that the solution space of (88) is as follows:{
σ : σ = L+v (θ ) + γ (1, 1, . . . , 1)T ,γ ∈ R
}
. (89)
The concrete proof of the above result is the same as the proof of
Proposition 3.2 of our prior work [23]. Hence, we skip the concrete
proof procedure here.
Based on the solution space of (88), we can easily see that
σ ∗i − σ ∗j =
∑
k ∈N
(
l+ik − l+jk
)
vk (θ ) ,∀i , j, i, j ∈ N . (90)
Next, we show that the matrix L+ has a strong connection with a
resistor network. As introduced in Section 4.3.1, we can construct
a resistor network based on the traffic network. Specifically, we
replace the links between locations with resistors. For all i, j ∈ N
with i < j , we replace the links (i, j) and (j, i) with a resistor, whose
resistance is given by ri j = 1βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξji
. Recall that we use Ri j (β)
to denote the effective resistance between nodes i and j in the
constructed resistor network.
The effective resistances in the resistor network have the follow-
ing relation with L+:
Ri j (β) = l+ii + l+j j − 2l+i j ,∀i, j ∈ N . (91)
Readers can refer to the following paper for more details of such a
connection between the effective resistances and the generalized
inverse of the Laplacian matrix: Gyan Ranjan, Zhi-Li Zhang, and
Daniel Boley. 2014. Incremental computation of pseudo-inverse of
Laplacian. In Proc. of COCOA. Wailea, HI, USA, 729–749.
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According to (91), we have the following relations for all i, j,k ∈
N :
l+ik =
l+ii + l
+
kk − Rik (β)
2 , (92)
l+jk =
l+j j + l
+
kk − Rjk (β)
2 . (93)
We further utilize (90) and the above two equalities to get the
following result:
σ ∗i − σ ∗j =
∑
k ∈N
(
l+ii + l
+
kk − Rik (β)
2 −
l+j j + l
+
kk − Rjk (β)
2
)
vk (θ )
=
∑
k ∈N
(
l+ii − l+j j + Rjk (β) − Rik (β)
2
)
vk (θ ) . (94)
Note that
∑
k ∈N vk (θ ) = 0. Hence, we have
∑
k ∈N l+iivk (θ ) = 0
and
∑
k ∈N l+j jvk (θ ) = 0. Therefore, we can get the following result:
σ ∗i − σ ∗j =
1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
Rjk (β) − Rik (β)
)
vk (θ ) . (95)
Last, we can utilize our results in (84) and (95) to get the expres-
sion of p∗i j (θ ):
p∗i j (θ ) =
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
σ ∗i − σ ∗j
2ξi j
=
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
Rjk (β) − Rik (β)
)
vk (θ ) .
(96)
This completes our proof of Proposition 4.2.
E SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR µ∗i j = 0
In this section, we prove that when the following sufficient condi-
tion holds, we have µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j):∑
k ∈N
|vk (θ )| ≤ min(i, j):i,j,i, j ∈N 2
(
βi j +
ξi j
ξ ji
βji
) (
2pmax − c −
αi j + ϵ
−
i j
βi j
)
.
(97)
According to the properties of effective resistances, the effective
resistances satisfy the triangle inequality. Hence, we have Rjk (β)−
Rik (β) ≤ Ri j (β) and Rik (β)−Rjk (β) ≤ Ri j (β) for any i, j,k ∈ N .
Furthermore, since the effective resistance between two locations is
no greater than the resistance of the resistor between them, we have
Ri j (β) ≤ ri j = 1βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξji
. Then, we can get the following inequality
for any i, j,k ∈ N :Rjk (β) − Rik (β) ≤ 1βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξ ji
. (98)
By using the above inequality, we can show the following rela-
tion:
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
Rjk (β) − Rik (β)
)
vk (θ )
≤
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
Rjk (β) − Rik (β) |vk (θ )|
≤
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
1
βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξ ji
∑
k ∈N
|vk (θ )| .
When the condition in (97), we can further derive the following
relation:
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
Rjk (β) − Rik (β)
)
vk (θ )
≤
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
1
2ξi j
1
βi j
ξi j
+
βji
ξ ji
min
(i˜, j˜):i˜,j˜, i˜, j˜ ∈N
(
βi˜ j˜ +
ξi˜ j˜
ξ j˜ i˜
β j˜ i˜
) (
2pmax − c −
αi˜ j˜ + ϵ
−
i˜ j˜
βi˜ j˜
)
≤
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
1
2
1
βi j +
ξi j βji
ξ ji
(
βi j +
ξi j
ξ ji
βji
) (
2pmax − c −
αi j + ϵ
−
i j
βi j
)
≤
αi j + ϵ
−
i j + βi jc
2βi j
+
(
pmax − 12c −
αi j + ϵ
−
i j
2βi j
)
≤ pmax. (99)
We letpi j =
αi j+ϵ−i j+βi jc
2βi j +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
Rjk (β) − Rik (β)
)
vk (θ )
and µi j = 0 for all (i, j), and let σ be the solution to Lσ = v (θ ).
From our analysis above, we can see that pi j ≤ pmax for all (i, j).
We can also verify that
{
pi j , µi j
}
i, j ∈N,i,j and σ satisfy the KKT
conditions. This implies that they constitute an optimal solution to
the optimization problem, which completes our proof.
F REGRET ANALYSIS WHEN µˆd−1,∗i j , 0 AT
THE BEGINNING
Recall that in Section 4.3.3, we mention that when µ∗i j = 0 for all
(i, j), µˆd−1,∗i j may be positive for some (i, j) at the beginning and
will become zero for all (i, j) after several days. We claim that in
this case, we can still prove that limD→∞ ∆πD = 0. We explain the
reason in this section.
Recall that ∆πD is defined as follows:
∆πD = E
π
{
1
D
D∑
d=1
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) )}
,
(100)
where pd andwd are the decisions under the policy π .
When µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j), µˆd−1,∗i j becomes zero for all (i, j) after
several days and no longer changes (as shown in Section 5). We
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use dTh ∈ {1, 2, . . .} to denote the threshold day, which is defined
as follows:
dTh ≜ min
{
d˜ : µˆd−1,∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) and all d ≥ d˜
}
. (101)
When D approaches infinity, we can rewrite ∆πD as follows:
∆πD =E
π
 1D
dTh−1∑
d=1
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) )
+ Eπ

1
D
D∑
d=dTh
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) ) .
(102)
We can see that as D approaches infinity, the first term on the right
side will become zero. Then, we have the following relation:
lim
D→∞∆
π
D = limD→∞E
π

1
D
D∑
d=dTh
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd , wd , ϵd
) ) .
That is to say, although µˆd−1,∗i j , 0 for some (i, j) and some d <
dTh, it does not affect our analysis of limD→∞ ∆πD . Based on the
definition of dTh, we have µˆd−1,∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) and all d ≥ dTh.
Then, we can still apply our proofs for Theorem 4.3 and Corollary
4.4 to show that as D approaches infinity, the time-average regret
for the days from d = dTh to d = D is zero:
lim
D→∞E
π

1
D−dTh+1
D∑
d=dTh
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd , wd , ϵd
) )=0.
(103)
Then, we can easily prove that limD→∞ ∆πD = 0.
G PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
In this section, we derive an upper bound for ∆πD . We conduct the
derivation by the following steps.
Step 1:We analyze an upper bound for
Rjk (β) − Rjk (βˆd−1).
Recall that Rjk (β) is the effective resistance between nodes j and
k when the resistor network is defined based on β , and Rjk
(
βˆd−1
)
is the effective resistance between j and k when the resistor net-
work is defined based on βˆd−1. According to our discussion in Sec-
tion 4.3.3, we can derive p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
using βˆd−1i j , αˆ
d−1
i j , Rjk
(
βˆd−1
)
,
Rik
(
βˆd−1
)
, andvk
(
θˆd−1
)
. In order to analyze
p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1),
we first analyze
Rjk (β) − Rjk (βˆd−1) in this step.
Next, we prove the following relation:Rjk (β) − Rjk (βˆd−1)
≤ 12
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
 1βmnξmn + βnmξnm −
1
βˆd−1mn
ξmn
+
βˆd−1nm
ξnm
 . (104)
Recall that in the resistor networks defined by β and βˆd−1, the resis-
tances of the resistor between any two different nodesm and n are
1
βmn
ξmn
+
βnm
ξnm
and 1
βˆd−1mn
ξmn
+
βˆd−1nm
ξnm
, respectively. We focus on the resistor
network defined by β and Rjk (β)with j , k . If we change the resis-
tance of the resistor between two particular nodesm and n (where
m and n can be any two different nodes including j and k) from
1
βmn
ξmn
+
βnm
ξnm
to 1
βˆd−1mn
ξmn
+
βˆd−1nm
ξnm
, then the effective resistance between j and
k will deviate from Rjk (β) by at most
 1βmnξmn + βnmξnm − 1βˆd−1mnξmn + βˆd−1nmξnm

(we can prove this using Thomson’s principle). We can repeat
the above analysis. After changing the resistance of all the re-
sistors in the network (i.e., for each pair (m,n), the resistance is
changed from 1βmn
ξmn
+
βnm
ξnm
to 1
βˆd−1mn
ξmn
+
βˆd−1nm
ξnm
), we can show that the ef-
fective resistance between j and k will deviate from Rjk (β) by at
most
∑
m∈N
∑
n>m,n∈N
 1βmnξmn + βnmξnm − 1βˆd−1mnξmn + βˆd−1nmξnm
. Note that we
consider the condition n > m in the inner summation to avoid
counting each pair (m,n) twice. Formally, we get the following
relation:
Rjk (β) − Rjk (βˆd−1)
≤
∑
m∈N
∑
n>m,n∈N\{m }
 1βmnξmn + βnmξnm −
1
βˆd−1mn
ξmn
+
βˆd−1nm
ξnm

=
1
2
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
 1βmnξmn + βnmξnm −
1
βˆd−1mn
ξmn
+
βˆd−1nm
ξnm
 . (105)
We can further derive the following result:
Rjk (β)−Rjk (βˆd−1)≤ 12 ∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
 1βmnξmn + βnmξnm −
1
βˆd−1mn
ξmn
+
βˆd−1nm
ξnm

=
1
2
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
 ξmnξnmβmnξnm + βnmξmn − ξmnξnmβˆd−1mn ξnm + βˆd−1nm ξmn

=
1
2
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
ξmnξ 2nm (βˆd−1mn − βmn ) + ξ 2mnξnm (βˆd−1nm − βnm )
(βmnξnm + βnmξmn )
(
βˆd−1mn ξnm + βˆd−1nm ξmn
)
≤ 12
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
ξmnξ 2nm (βˆd−1mn − βmn ) + ξ 2mnξnm (βˆd−1nm − βnm )
β2min (ξmn + ξnm )2
≤ 12
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
ξmnξnm
(
ξnm | |θˆd−1mn − θmn | |2 + ξmn | |θˆd−1nm − θnm | |2
)
β2min (ξmn + ξnm )2
.
(106)
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Note that we can do the following rearrangement:∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
ξmnξnmξmn | |θˆd−1nm − θnm | |2
β2min (ξmn + ξnm )2
=
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈N\{n }
ξnmξmnξnm | |θˆd−1mn − θmn | |2
β2min (ξnm + ξmn )2
=
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
ξnmξmnξnm | |θˆd−1mn − θmn | |2
β2min (ξnm + ξmn )2
. (107)
Considering (106), we can further get the following result:Rjk (β)−Rjk (βˆd−1)≤ ∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
ξmnξ
2
nm | |θˆd−1mn − θmn | |2
β2min (ξmn + ξnm )2
≤ 1
β2min
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈N\{m }
ξmn | |θˆd−1mn − θmn | |2.
(108)
The result above shows an upper bound of
Rjk (β)−Rjk (βˆd−1).
Step 2:We analyze an upper bound for
p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1).
Recall that p∗i j (θ ) and p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
correspond to the optimal so-
lutions to problems (11) and (9), respectively. Based on Proposition
4.2, we have the following relation:
p∗i j (θ )=
cβi j+αi j+ϵ
−
i j
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
Rjk (β)−Rik (β)
)
vk (θ ) ,
(109)
where vk (θ ) is given by
vk (θ ) =
∑
j ∈N\{k }
(
αk j − cβk j − ϵ−k j
)
−
∑
j ∈N\{k }
(
α jk − cβjk − ϵ−jk
)
.
(110)
It is easy to see that we can rearrange the expression of p∗i j (θ ) as
follows:
p∗i j (θ ) =
cβi j + αi j + ϵ−i j
2βi j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
(
Rjk (β )−Rik (β )−Rjm (β )+Rim (β )
) (
αkm−cβkm−ϵ−km
)
.
(111)
Similarly, we have the following relation for p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
:
p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
=
c βˆd−1i j + αˆ
d−1
i j + ϵ
−
i j
2βˆd−1i j
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
(
Rjk
(
βˆd−1
)
−Rik
(
βˆd−1
)
−Rjm
(
βˆd−1
)
+Rim
(
βˆd−1
)) (
αˆd−1km −c βˆd−1km −ϵ−km
)
.
(112)
Next, we derive an upper bound for
p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1).
(Step 2-A) In this part, we derive an upper bound for the term cβi j+αi j+ϵ−i j2βi j − c βˆd−1i j +αˆd−1i j +ϵ−i j2βˆd−1i j
.
We can easily derive the following relation:cβi j + αi j + ϵ
−
i j
2βi j
−
c βˆd−1i j + αˆ
d−1
i j + ϵ
−
i j
2βˆd−1i j

=
1
2βi j βˆd−1i j
βˆd−1i j (αi j + ϵ−i j ) − βi j (αˆd−1i j + ϵ−i j )
(a)≤ 1
2β2min
(
βmax
αi j − αˆd−1i j  + αmax βi j − βˆd−1i j )
≤αmax + βmax
2β2min
| |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2. (113)
Note that when deriving inequality (a), we have used the facts
that |x1x2 − x3x4 | = |x1x2 − x3x2 + x3x2 − x3x4 | ≤ |x2 | |x1 − x3 | +
|x3 | |x2 − x4 | (where x1, x2, x3, and x4 are real numbers) and αi j +
ϵ−i j > αmin + ϵ ≥ βmaxpmax > 0.
(Step 2-B) In this part, we derive an upper bound for the follow-
ing term:(Rjk (β)−Rik (β)−Rjm (β)+Rim (β))
−
(
Rjk
(
βˆd−1
)
−Rik
(
βˆd−1
)
−Rjm
(
βˆd−1
)
+Rim
(
βˆd−1
)) .
We can see that the following relation holds:(Rjk (β)−Rik (β)−Rjm (β)+Rim (β))
−
(
Rjk
(
βˆd−1
)
−Rik
(
βˆd−1
)
−Rjm
(
βˆd−1
)
+Rim
(
βˆd−1
))
≤
Rjk (β) − Rjk (βˆd−1) + Rik (β) − Rik (βˆd−1)
+
Rjm (β) − Rjm (βˆd−1) + Rim (β) − Rim (βˆd−1)
≤ 4
β2min
∑
m˜∈N
∑
n˜∈N\{m˜ }
ξm˜n˜ | |θˆd−1m˜n˜ − θm˜n˜ | |2. (114)
The second inequality is based on (108).
(Step 2-C) In this part, we derive an upper bound for the term(αkm−cβkm−ϵ−km ) − (αˆd−1km −c βˆd−1km −ϵ−km ).We can derive the up-
per bound as follows:(αkm − cβkm − ϵ−km ) − (αˆd−1km − c βˆd−1km − ϵ−km )
≤
αkm − αˆd−1km  + c βkm − βˆd−1km 
≤ (1 + c) | |θkm − θˆd−1km | |2. (115)
(Step 2-D)We derive upper bounds for
αˆd−1km −c βˆd−1km −ϵ−km  andRjk (β)−Rik (β)−Rjm (β)+Rim (β).
Recall that we assume that αmin − βmaxpmax +ϵ ≥ 0 and 0 < c <
pmax. Therefore, we have αˆd−1km −c βˆd−1km −ϵ−km > αmin−pmaxβmax−
ϵ−km ≥ αmin − pmaxβmax ≥ −ϵ > 0. We derive an upper bound forαˆd−1km −c βˆd−1km −ϵ−km  as follows:αˆd−1km −c βˆd−1km −ϵ−km  ≤ αmax + ϵ−km  ≤ αmax − ϵ, (116)
where the second inequality is based on ϵ−km =
∫ 0
ϵ ϵ
d
kmdFkm
(
ϵdkm
)
∈[
ϵ, 0
]
.
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We derive a bound for
Rjk (β)−Rik (β)−Rjm (β)+Rim (β) as
follows: Rjk (β)−Rik (β)−Rjm (β)+Rim (β)
≤ Rjk (β)−Rjm (β) + |Rim (β)−Rik (β)|
(a)≤ 2Rkm (β)
(b)≤ 2rkm
=2 1
βkm
ξkm
+
βmk
ξmk
≤ 2 1
βmin
ξkm
+
βmin
ξmk
≤ 2ξkm
βmin
. (117)
The inequality (a) is based on the triangle inequality for effective
resistances, and the inequality (b) is based on the fact that the effec-
tive resistance between two nodes is no greater than the resistance
of the resistor that directly connects the two nodes.
(Step 2-E)We combine the results in Steps 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, and
2-D, and derive an upper bound for
p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1). The basic
idea is to utilize the inequality that |x1x2 − x3x4 | ≤ |x2 | |x1 − x3 | +
|x3 | |x2 − x4 | (where x1, x2, x3, and x4 are real numbers).
According to the expressions of p∗i j (θ ) and p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
in (111)
and (112) and the results in Steps 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, and 2-D, we can
get the following relation:p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1)
≤αmax + βmax
2β2min
| |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
2ξkm
βmin
(1 + c) | |θkm − θˆd−1km | |2
+
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
(
αmax − ϵ
) 4
β2min
∑
m˜∈N
∑
n˜∈N\{m˜ }
ξm˜n˜ | |θˆd−1m˜n˜ − θm˜n˜ | |2
=
αmax + βmax
2β2min
| |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2
+
1 + c
2ξi jβmin
∑
k ∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
ξkm | |θkm − θˆd−1km | |2
+
αmax − ϵ
ξi jβ
2
min
N (N − 1)
∑
k ∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
ξkm | |θkm − θˆd−1km | |2
=
αmax + βmax
2β2min
| |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2
+
1
ξi jβmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)∑
k ∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
ξkm | |θkm−θˆd−1km | |2.
(118)
This completes our analysis in Step 2.
Step 3:We analyze the gap between Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
and
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
(i.e., the payoff under our policy) when d is odd and
d ≥ 5.
According to our policy, when d is odd, the provider implements
p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
as the pricing decision andw∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
as the supply deci-
sion for each link (i, j). The expressions ofEϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)}
and Eϵd
{
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
are given as follows:
Eϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)}
=
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) + ϵ−i j
)
p∗i j (θ )
−
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ )
)
c, (119)
E
ϵd
{
Π
(
pd , wd , ϵd
)}
=E
ϵd
{
Π
(
p∗
(
θˆd−1
)
, w ∗
(
θˆd−1
)
, ϵd
)}
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi jEϵd
{
min
{
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
+ ϵdi j , αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)}}
p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
))
c . (120)
In order to bound
Eϵd {Π (p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd )} − Eϵd {Π (pd ,wd ,ϵd )},
we first prove some preliminary results.
(Step 3-A)We analyze an upper bound for |αi j −βi jp∗i j (θ )+ϵ−i j −
Eϵd
{
min
{
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
+ ϵdi j , αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)}}
|.We
define a threshold ϵTh as follows:
ϵTh ≜ αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
−
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
))
. (124)
Using the notation ϵTh, we can bound the term |αi j−βi jp∗i j (θ )+ϵ−i j−
Eϵd
{
min
{
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
+ ϵdi j , αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)}}
| as
follows:αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) + ϵ−i j
−Eϵd
{
min
{
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
+ ϵdi j , αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)}}
=
∫ϵdi j<ϵTh
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) −
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)))
dFi j
(
ϵdi j
)
+ ϵ−i j −
∫
ϵdi j<ϵTh
ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
)
+
∫
ϵdi j ≥ϵTh
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) −
(
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)))
dFi j
(
ϵdi j
)
≤Fi j (ϵTh)
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) − (αi j − βi jp∗i j (θˆd−1))
+
(
1 − Fi j (ϵTh)
) αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) − (αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j (θˆd−1))
+
ϵ−i j − ∫ϵdi j<ϵTh ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
) . (125)
It is easy to verify that the following results hold:αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) − (αi j − βi jp∗i j (θˆd−1))≤ βmax p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1) ,
(126)αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) − (αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j (θˆd−1))
≤
αi j − αˆd−1i j  + βˆd−1i j p∗i j (θˆd−1) − βi jp∗i j (θ )
≤ (1 + pup) | |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2 + βmax p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1) . (127)
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Eϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd
)}
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) + ϵ−i j
)
p∗i j (θ ) −
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ )
)
c .
(121)
Eϵd
{
Π
(
pd , wd , ϵd
)}
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi jEϵd
{
min
{
αi j − βi j
(
p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
− ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η
)
+ ϵdi j , αˆ
d−2
i j − βˆd−2i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η
}} (
p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
− ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η
)
−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αˆd−2i j − βˆd−2i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ ρd−η
)
c .
(122)Eϵd {Π (p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd )} − Eϵd {Π (pd , wd , ϵd )}
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax + βmaxpup
) (p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−2) + ρβmin d−η
)
+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi jpup
(
2
(
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆd−2i j | |2 + βmax p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−2) + βmaxβmin ρd−η
)
+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi jc
( (
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆd−2i j | |2 + βmax p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−2) + ρd−η )
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆd−2i j | |2+∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−2)+∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax
βmin
+ 2 βmax
βmin
pup + c
)
ρd−η .
(123)
Recall that pup is a notation defined before (in Step 3 of Section C)
and it satisfies pup ≥
p∗i j (θˆd−1) , p∗i j (θ ).
Next, we analyze an upper bound for
ϵ−i j − ∫ϵdi j<ϵTh ϵdi jdFi j (ϵdi j ).
We can derive the following relation:ϵ−i j − ∫ϵdi j<ϵTh ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
)
=
∫ϵdi j<0 ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
)
−
∫
ϵdi j<ϵTh
ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
) . (128)
If ϵTh = αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
−
(
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
))
> 0, we
haveϵ−i j − ∫ϵdi j<ϵTh ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
) =
∫0≤ϵdi j<ϵTh ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
) ≤ |ϵTh | .
(129)
If ϵTh ≤ 0, we haveϵ−i j − ∫ϵdi j<ϵTh ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
) =
∫ϵTh≤ϵdi j<0 ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
) ≤ |ϵTh | .
(130)
Therefore, we can conclude thatϵ−i j − ∫ϵdi j<ϵTh ϵdi jdFi j
(
ϵdi j
) ≤ |ϵTh |
=
αˆd−1i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j (θˆd−1) − (αi j − βi jp∗i j (θˆd−1))
≤ (1 + pup) | |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2. (131)
Combining our results in (125), (126), (127), and (131), we can
get the following relation:αi j − βi jp∗i j (θ ) + ϵ−i j
−Eϵd
{
min
{
αi j − βi jp∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)
+ ϵdi j , αˆ
d−1
i j − βˆd−1i j p∗i j
(
θˆd−1
)}}
≤2 (1 + pup) | |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2 + βmax p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1) . (132)
Here, we have used the fact that the convex combination of two
real numbers is no greater than each of the two numbers.
(Step 3-B)Wederive an upper bound for |Eϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)}
−
Eϵd
{
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
|. The basic idea is still to utilize the inequal-
ity that |x1x2 − x3x4 | ≤ |x2 | |x1 − x3 | + |x3 | |x2 − x4 | (where x1, x2,
x3, and x4 are real numbers). Based on (119) and (120), we can get
the bound as follows:Eϵd {Π (p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd )} − Eϵd {Π (pd , wd , ϵd )}
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi jpup
(
2
(
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2 + βmax p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1))
+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax + βmaxpup
) p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1)
+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi jc
( (
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2 + βmax p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1))
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆd−1i j | |2
+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1) .
(134)
Recall that in (118), we give an upper bound for
p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆd−1).
We complete our analysis in Step 3.
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E{ D∑
d=5
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd , wd , ϵd
) )}
≤E

⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
( Π (p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵ2s+1) − Π (p2s+1, w 2s+1, ϵ2s+1) + Π (p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵ2s+2) − Π (p2s+2, w 2s+2, ϵ2s+2) )
≤E

⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j 2
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆ 2si j | |2 + ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j 2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) p∗i j (θ ) − p∗i j (θˆ 2s )ª®¬

+ E

⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax
βmin
+ 2 βmax
βmin
pup + c
)
ρ(2s + 2)−η ª®¬

≤E

⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j 2
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
) | |θi j − θˆ 2si j | |2 + ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax
βmin
+ 2 βmax
βmin
pup + c
)
ρ(2s + 2)−η ª®¬

+ E

⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j 2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) ©­« αmax + βmax2β2min | |θi j − θˆ 2si j | |2 + 1ξi j βmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)∑
k∈N
∑
m∈N\{k }
ξkm | |θkm−θˆ 2skm | |2
ª®¬ª®¬

=E

⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
(
αmax
βmin
+ 2 βmax
βmin
pup + c
)
ρ(2s + 2)−η ª®¬

+ E

⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
(
2
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
)
+ 2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) αmax + βmax
2β2min
+ 2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) 1
βmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)
N (N − 1)
) ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j | |θi j − θˆ 2si j | |2

≤ ©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®¬ ρ
(
αmax
βmin
+ 2 βmax
βmin
pup + c
) ⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
(2s + 2)−η
+
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®¬
(
2
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
)
+2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) αmax + βmax
2β2min
+2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) 1
βmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)
N (N − 1)
) √
Φ1 (ρ, η)
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η .
(133)
Step 4:We analyze the gap between Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
and
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)
(i.e., the payoff under our policy) when d is even
and d ≥ 6.
According to our policy, whend is even, the provider implements
p∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
− ρ
βˆd−2i j
d−η as the pricing decision andw∗i j
(
θˆd−2
)
+ρd−η
as the supply decision for each link (i, j). Based on our definition
of pup in Section C, we have pup ≥
p∗i j (θˆd−2) − ρβˆd−2i j d−η
. The ex-
pressions ofEϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)}
andEϵd
{
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
are given in (121) and (122). We can use an approach that is similar
to the one used in Step 3 to bound |Eϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)}
−
Eϵd
{
Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
|, and we show the result in (123).
Step 5: In this step, we combine our results in the steps above,
and bound E
{
1
D
∑D
d=5
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) )}
.
Note that in Step 3 and Step 4, we analyze the upper bound for
Eϵd
{
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
)}
, where the expecta-
tion is taken with respect to ϵd . Considering the randomness of
ϵ1,ϵ2, . . . ,ϵD , we can utilize Theorem 4.1 and the results in Step
2, Step 3, and Step 4 to derive (133).
From (133), we can see that we need to bound
∑ ⌊ D−12 ⌋
s=2 (2s + 2)−η
and
∑ ⌊ D−12 ⌋
s=2
√
ln(2s)
(2s)1−2η . We first derive the upper bound of the term∑ ⌊ D−12 ⌋
s=2 (2s + 2)−η as follows:
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
(2s + 2)−η =
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
∫ s+1
s
(2s + 2)−ηdz
≤
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
∫ s+1
s
(2z)−ηdz =
∫ ⌊ D−12 ⌋+1
2
(2z)−ηdz
=
1
2
∫ 2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋+2
4
(z˜)−ηdz˜ < 12
1
1 − η
(
2
(
D − 1
2
)
+ 2
)1−η
=
1
2
1
1 − η (D + 1)
1−η . (135)
It is easy to see that the following relation holds for any D ≥ 5
(recall that 0 < η < 12 ):
(
D + 1
D
)1−η
≤
(
6
5
)1−η
<
6
5 . (136)
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Therefore, we can bound
∑ ⌊ D−12 ⌋
s=2 (2s + 2)−η as follows:
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
(2s + 2)−η < 35
1
1 − ηD
1−η . (137)
Next, we derive the upper bound of the term
∑ ⌊ D−12 ⌋
s=2
√
ln(2s)
(2s)1−2η . We
can easily prove that
√
ln(z)
(z)1−2η increases with z when 0 < z ≤ e
1
1−2η
and decreases with z when z > e
1
1−2η . When D > 4+ e
1
1−2η , since D
is an integer, we can prove that ⌊ D−12 ⌋ ≥ ⌊ 12e
1
1−2η ⌋ + 2. Then, we
can bound
∑ ⌊ D−12 ⌋
s=2
√
ln(2s)
(2s)1−2η as follows:
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η <
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=1
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η
=
⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+1∑
s=1
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η +
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s= ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η
=
⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+1∑
s=1
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η +
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s= ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
∫ s+1
s
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η dz
≤
⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+1∑
s=1
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η +
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s= ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
∫ s+1
s
√
ln (2 (z − 1))
(2 (z − 1))1−2η dz
=
⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+1∑
s=1
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η +
1
2
∫ 2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋
2 ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
√
ln (z˜)
(z˜)1−2η dz˜. (138)
Since we have the following relation:
d
(
1
(η+0.5)
√
ln zzη+0.5
)
dz
=
1
2 (η + 0.5)
zη−0.5√
ln z
+ zη−0.5
√
ln z, (139)
we can bound 12
∫ 2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋
2 ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
√
ln(z˜)
(z˜)1−2η dz˜ as follows:
1
2
∫ 2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋
2 ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
√
ln (z˜)
(z˜)1−2η dz˜
<
1
2
∫ 2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋
2 ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
√
ln (z)
(z)1−2η dz +
1
2
∫ 2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋
2 ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
1
2 (η + 0.5)
zη−0.5√
ln z
dz
=
1
2
∫ 2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋
2 ⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+2
(√
ln (z)
(z)1−2η +
1
2 (η + 0.5)
zη−0.5√
ln z
)
dz
<
1
2
(
1
(η + 0.5)
√
ln zzη+0.5
)
|z=2 ⌊ D−12 ⌋
=
1
2
1
(η + 0.5)
√
ln
(
2⌊D − 12 ⌋
) (
2⌊D − 12 ⌋
)η+0.5
≤ 1(2η + 1)
√
lnD (D)η+0.5 . (140)
Therefore, we have derived an upper bound for
∑ ⌊ D−12 ⌋
s=2
√
ln(2s)
(2s)1−2η
as follows:
⌊ D−12 ⌋∑
s=2
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η <
⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+1∑
s=1
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η +
1
2η + 1
√
lnD (D)η+0.5 .
(141)
Considering (133), (137), and (141), we can characterize an upper
bound for E
{∑D
d=5
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) )}
in
inequality (142).We can easily prove that the value of the expression
E
{∑4
d=1
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) )}
is upper-bounded
by a term that is independent of D, as shown below:
E
{ 4∑
d=1
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) ,w∗ (θ ) ,ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd ,wd ,ϵd
) )}
≤8N 2ξmax
(
pup + c
) (
αmax + βmaxpup
)
. (144)
Hence, we can characterize an upper bound for ∆πD in (143).
In (143), we can see that the upper bound consists of three terms,
and they are proportional to D−1, (lnD) 12 (D)η− 12 , and D−η , respec-
tively. We can let Φ2 (ρ,η), Φ3 (ρ,η), and Φ4 (ρ,η) be the coefficients
(i.e., the parts that are independent of D) of these three terms. Then,
we can rewrite (143) as
∆πD < Φ2 (ρ,η)D−1 + Φ3 (ρ,η) (lnD)
1
2 Dη−
1
2 + Φ4 (ρ,η)D−η .
(145)
This completes our proof for Theorem 4.3.
H PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.4
In this section, we prove that limD→∞ ∆πD = 0. According to Theo-
rem 4.3, the upper bound of ∆πD in (15) consists of the terms that
are proportional to D−1, (lnD) 12 Dη− 12 , and D−η . It is easy to see
that limD→∞ D−1 = 0 and limD→∞ D−η = 0. Furthermore, since
η ∈
(
0, 12
)
, we have the following relations:
lim
D→∞
(lnD) 12
D
1
2−η
= lim
D→∞
1
2(lnD) 12
1
D(
1
2 − η
)
D− 12−η
= lim
D→∞
1
(1 − 2η)D 12−η (lnD) 12
= 0. (146)
Therefore, as D goes to infinity, all the terms of the upper bound of
∆πD approaches zero. This implies that limD→∞ ∆
π
D = 0.
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E{ D∑
d=5
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd
)
− Π
(
pd , wd , ϵd
) )}
<
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®¬ ρ
(
αmax
βmin
+ 2 βmax
βmin
pup + c
)
3
5
1
1 − η D
1−η
+
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®¬
(
2
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
)
+2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) αmax + βmax
2β2min
+2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) 1
βmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)
N (N − 1)
) √
Φ1 (ρ, η)
⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+1∑
s=1
√
ln (2s)
(2s)1−2η
+
©­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®¬
(
2
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
)
+2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) αmax + βmax
2β2min
+2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) 1
βmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)
N (N − 1)
) √
Φ1 (ρ, η) 12η + 1
√
lnD (D)η+0.5 .
(142)
∆πD = E

1
D
D∑
d=1
(
Π
(
p∗ (θ ) , w ∗ (θ ) , ϵd
)
−Π
(
pd , wd , ϵd
) )
<
©­­­­­«
8N 2ξmax
(
pup+c
) (
αmax+βmaxpup
)
+
©­­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®®¬
©­«2
(
2pup+c
) (
1+pup
)
+
(
αmax+2pupβmax+cβmax
) αmax + βmax
β2min
+2
(
αmax+2pupβmax+cβmax
) 1
βmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)
N (N −1)ª®¬
√
Φ1 (ρ, η)
⌊ 12 e
1
1−2η ⌋+1∑
s=1
√
ln (2s )
(2s )1−2η
ª®®®®®¬
D−1
+
©­­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®®¬
©­«2
(
2pup + c
) (
1 + pup
)
+
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) αmax + βmax
β2min
+2
(
αmax + 2pupβmax + cβmax
) 1
βmin
(
1+c
2 +
αmax−ϵ
βmin
N (N −1)
)
N (N − 1)ª®¬
√
Φ1 (ρ, η)
1
2η + 1
√
lnD (D)η−0.5
+
©­­«
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\{i }
ξi j
ª®®¬ ρ
(
αmax
βmin
+ 2 βmax
βmin
pup + c
)
3
5
1
1 − η D
−η . (143)
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